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In celebrating the one hundredth anniversary of the Hague Conference on
Private International Law, we should remember that the United States missed
many earlier birthday parties. Moreover, although we have been a member of
the Conference since 1964,1 other members-particularly countries that are also
parties to the Hague Service Convention2 and the Hague Evidence Conven-
tion3-may doubt this country's willingness to abide by the international
obligations we have incurred. A recent domestic lawmaking initiative to amend
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4 seems unlikely to dispel our partners'
uneasiness, and that can hardly help U.S. efforts to reopen negotiations at the
Hague in an area where we do not have the upper hand-the recognition and
enforcement of internationally foreign judgments.'
The story of U.S. ambivalence about international commitments is not
confined to the law of procedure, and it is not a new story.6 Proper under-
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1. The United States joined the Hague Conference and the International (Rome) Institute for the
Unification of Private Law pursuant to authorization contained in Act of Dec. 30, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-
244, 77 Stat. 775. For a description of this country's participation in those and other international
organizations, see Peter H. Pfund, United States Participation in Transnational Lawmaking, in LEX
MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION 167 (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., 1990).
2. Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or
Commercial Matters, opened for signature Nov. 15, 1965, art. 2, 20 U.S.T. 361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163
[hereinafter Hague Service Convention].
3. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, opened for
signature March 18, 1970, art. 2, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter Hague Evidence
Convention].
4. See infra text accompanying notes 99-179.
5. For a description and analysis of the United States's recent proposal for a convention dealing
with the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, see Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: A New Approach for the Hague Conference?, 57 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 271 (Summer 1994); Hague Conference on Private International Law, Conclusions of the
Working Group Meeting on Enforcement of Judgments (Preliminary Doc. No. 19, Jan. 4, 1993).
6. See, e.g., Harry L. Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a Program
for Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 515, 556-59 (1953); Kurt H. Nadelmann, Ignored State Interests: The Federal
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standing of the current situation requires a contextual setting, both historical
and institutional. The history of U.S. engagement with procedural problems in
international civil litigation is short. Not so the list of institutional actors
empowered to make or apply procedural law for international civil litigation in
the courts of this country. Indeed, the shortness of the history is related to the
length of the list of relevant institutional actors. For years, the supposed
requirements of U.S. federalism hindered international lawmaking through
private international law treaties7 as effectively as they did a federal law of
procedure for federal courts.' Although the latter situation changed in the
1930s,9 federalism objections die hard in the international arena.
The states of the United States and their constituent lawmaking institutions
remain important actors in international civil litigation in this country.
Nonetheless, I leave them largely out of this article. In part, that is a concession
to the shortness of life. In addition, this article is about international
cooperation and the lawmaking institutions most appropriately involved in its
pursuit (or in decisions not to cooperate). The states are powerless to reach
international agreements, 0 and, in areas of federal lawmaking competence,
they make law only by federal sufferance. There is federal lawmaking
competence on the major procedural issues in international civil litigation, but
sufferance may be an appropriate posture." A decision between state and
federal law is appropriately made, however, only after considering the full array
of lawmaking techniques. That array is available only at the federal level.
Although my focus is on procedural law and lawmaking for international
civil litigation in U.S. courts, it is also important to consider the arrangements
we have made, or might in the future make, in aid of litigation abroad. Our
record in providing judicial assistance is enviable, but it is a record that
continues to haunt us, encouraging Americans to think that no good deed goes
unpunished and foreigners to think that, in law as in life, there is no free
lunch. 2
Putting state lawmaking institutions to the side, I am concerned with the
history and potential of procedural lawmaking for international civil litigation
by means of federal legislation, federal court rulemaking, federal judge-made
law, and treaties. After describing and analyzing the previous involvement of
Government and International Efforts to Unify Rules of Private Law, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 323 (1954).
7. See Jones, supra note 6, at 556-58; Nadelmann, supra note 6, at 357-62.
8. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1048-94,
1108-12 (1982). The main opponent of the Enabling Act, Senator Thomas Walsh, couched his
arguments less in terms of federalism than in terms of convenience to lawyers. Id. at 1111.
9. The Supreme Court promulgated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1937 (effective in
1938), 308 U.S. 645, 649 (1938), pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Act of June 19, 1934, Pub.
L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064.
10. "No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation .... U.S. CONsT. art. I,
§ 10. See Jones, supra note 6, at 561-62.
11. See, e.g., Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 227-48 (1972); Stephen
B. Burbank, Federal Judgments Law: Sources of Authority and Sources of Rules, 70 TEx. L. REV. 1551,
1571-87 (1992).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 272-86.
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these various forms of federal lawmaking in Part II of this article," I turn in
Part III to common threads that run through our lawmaking efforts. 4 Chief
among those threads are unilateralism, a preference for national over
international uniformity, impatience, and penuriousness. These related
approaches and attitudes have in the past prevented or hindered the process of
dialogue and mutual education necessary for international cooperation. I argue
that unilateralism deserves to be buried, not reborn, that international
uniformity is increasingly more important than national uniformity, and that
both international education and education about international and comparative
law require more patience and more public resources than we have previously
been willing to commit. These conclusions have implications that I explore in
Part IV with reference to both domestic and international lawmaking structures
and techniques."5
II
LAWMAKING APPROACHES AND INSTITUTIONS IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
A. Congressional Legislation
1. Procedural Legislation in General. Congress has only rarely prescribed the
procedural rules to be applied in federal or state courts, including the rules
applicable to international civil litigation. Rather, in the case of federal courts,
Congress has usually chosen to proceed by delegation, de jure or de facto, and
it has rarely disturbed the procedures employed in state courts even in
connection with federal statutory rights.
Congress's de jure delegations have come in a series of statutes, dating to the
beginning of the Republic, 6 empowering the federal courts to make local rules
of procedure and empowering the Supreme Court to prescribe supervisory or
national rules for the lower federal courts.17 Its de facto delegations came in
a series of statutes (process acts) requiring the federal courts to follow state
procedure in civil actions at law. 8 The two species of delegated power
coexisted, at times uneasily, until the Conformity Act of 1872,'9 in which
Congress strengthened the federal courts' obligation to follow state procedural
13. See infra text accompanying notes 16-264.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 265-327.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 328-67.
16. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 17(b), 1 Stat. 73, 83; Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2,
1 Stat. 275, 276.
17. See PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 749-59 (3d ed. 1988).
18. See id. at 755-59; Burbank, supra note 8, at 1036-39.
Equity had remained free of any requirement of conformity since the beginning of the
Republic; it had been governed by court rules promulgated by the Supreme Court since 1822,
and it was preserved against the depredations of code merger (via court rule) by Supreme
Court interpretation.
Id. at 1039 (footnotes omitted).
19. Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, §§ 5-6, 17 Stat. 196, 197.
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law, preferring dynamic conformity to state law to the potential mediating
power of federal court rules.2" A long campaign to reinvigorate the national
rulemaking power ensued, culminating in the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 and
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect in 1938.21
Throughout the long period prior to the Federal Rules, Congress occasional-
ly departed from its pattern of delegation by enacting statutory provisions
regulating particular aspects of federal court procedure. Indeed, the existence
of such federal statutes, rendering complete conformity to state law impossible,
furnished an arrow in the quiver of those who sought to replace the Conformity
Act of 1872 with rulemaking by the Supreme Court.22 Very few of Congress's
efforts, however, were directed at international civil litigation.' In that area,
federal legislation tended to be not only episodic, but also reactive. Thus,
outrage that prime suspects in the Teapot Dome scandal were hiding from U.S.
justice in Europe prompted legislation to broaden the reach of the subpoena
and contempt powers. 24 The Supreme Court subsequently upheld the statutes
as implemented,' but some have questioned whether our legal institutions
were not more responsive to a domestic political crisis than they were to the
requirements of international law.
26
In the years after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective, and
until approximately 1975, Congress had additional incentives to stay out of
federal court procedure. The desire to rid the books of laws inconsistent with
the Federal Rules, which led to the provision in the 1934 Enabling Act known
as the supersession clause,27 was finally satisfied in the 1948 revision of the
Judicial Code.' Thereafter, such federal statutory provisions on court
procedure as did creep into law were few and far between.
Since 1975, when Congress transmuted into statute proposed Rules of
Evidence that the Supreme Court had promulgated under the Enabling Act,29
Congress has become more active in supervising national court rulemaking and
20. See Burbank, supra note 8, at 1039-40.
21. See id. at 1040-98.
22. See id. at 1040-41.
23. Moreover, the existence of federal legislation did not ensure either that it was known to exist
or that it was enthusiastically applied. See Jones, supra note 6, at 540-41; Walter B. Stahr, Discovery
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782for Foreign and International Proceedings, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 597, 600-02 (1990).
24. See Act of July 3, 1926, ch. 762, 44 Stat. 835-36; Hans Smit, International Aspects of Federal
Civil Procedure, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1031, 1044-45 (1961).
25. See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1931).
26. See Smit, supra note 24, at 1045-49.
27. Section 1 of the 1934 Rules Enabling Act provided in pertinent part: "[Said rules] shall take
effect six months after their promulgation, and thereafter, all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no
further force or effect." Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064. For the history of this
provision, see Burbank, supra note 8, at 1052-54. For recent attempts to delete the supersession clause,
see Stephen B. Burbank, Hold the Corks: A Comment on Paul Carrington's "Substance" and
"Procedure" in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1012, 1036-46.
28. See Burbank, supra note 27, at 1043-44.
29. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926. In fact, the process started two years
earlier, when Congress enacted a statute providing that the proposed rules not be effective unless
expressly approved by Congress. Act of March 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9.
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in independently framing rules for federal court litigation.3" A comprehensive
overhaul in 1988 of the statutes empowering the federal courts to make local
and national rules31 was animated in part by the hope that Congress might
again assume a passive role.32 So long, however, as the alleged costs and
delays of litigation are an overtly political issue,33 that seems unlikely, as does
the prospect that ambitious politicians will be persuaded to leave all of the
reform initiative with the federal rulemakers. 4
2. The Commission and Advisory Committee on International Rules of Judicial
Procedure. A major exception to Congress's hands-off attitude towards federal
procedural law in the period between 1938 and 1975 occurred precisely in the
area of international civil litigation. In 1964, Congress enacted a number of
provisions relating to international judicial assistance.3 5 A closer look at the
process by which the 1964 legislation was formulated is important to an
understanding of policies and attitudes with respect to, and institutional
structures for, lawmaking in international civil litigation.
Following World War II, U.S. lawyers engaged in international transactions
became increasingly concerned that adequate mechanisms did not exist for
judicial assistance (including service of process, taking evidence abroad, and
proof of foreign law) in international civil litigation in our courts. It also
became apparent that those involved in litigation abroad had some of the same
problems with respect to assistance from the United States.3 6 From at least
1950, therefore, various bar groups sought to move the United States to
international cooperation. 37  Finally, in 1958, Congress established a Commis-
sion and Advisory Committee on International Rules of Judicial Procedure.38
It defined the purposes of the Commission as follows:
SEC. 2. The Commission shall investigate and study existing practices of judicial
assistance and cooperation between the United States and foreign countries with a
view to achieving improvements. To the end that procedures necessary or incidental
30. See H.R. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5, 8-9, 12-14 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 HOUSE
REPORT].
31. Act of Nov. 19, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, §§ 401-407, 102 Stat. 4648-52 (amending 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2071-74).
32. See 1985 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 30, at 16, 22; Burbank, supra note 27, at 1043. The 1985
House Report was specifically incorporated by reference into the legislative history of the 1988 statute.
H.R. REP. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1988).
33. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Taking Aim at the American Legal System: The Council on
Competitiveness's Agenda for Legal Reform, 75 JUDICATURE 244 (1992).
34. See, e.g., Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 101-105, 104 Stat. 5089-98
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82); Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call
for a Moratorium, 59 BROOKLYN L. REV. 841 (1993); Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in
Procedural Justice, 77 MINN. L. REV. 375 (1992). For a somewhat dated account of the role of the
Judicial Conference of the United States in federal legislation affecting the judiciary, see PETER G.
FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 301-39 (1973).
35. Act of Oct. 3, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-619, 78 Stat. 995.
36. See Jones, supra note 6, at 515-17, 558-59.
37. See id. at 558-59; Harry L. Jones, International Judicial Procedures, in 1954 PROC. INT'L BAR
ASS'N 83, 94-97 (1956); Resolution Concerning Negotiation of Treaties of Judicial Assistance, 1951 PROC.
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 188-90.
38. Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-906, 72 Stat. 1743.
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to the conduct and settlement of litigation in State and Federal courts and quasi-
judicial agencies which involve the performance of acts in foreign territory, such as the.
service of judicial documents, the obtaining of evidence, and the proof of foreign law,
may be more readily ascertainable, efficient, economical, and expeditious, and that the
procedures of our State and Federal tribunals for the rendering of assistance to foreign
courts and quasi-judicial agencies be similarly improved, the Commission shall-
(a) draft for the assistance of the Secretary of State international
agreements to be negotiated by him;
(b) draft and recommend to the President any necessary legislation;
(c) recommend to the President such other action as may appear
advisable to improve and codify international practice in civil,
criminal, and administrative proceedings; and
(d) perform such other related duties as the President may assign.39
Unfortunately, the Commission and its Advisory Committee labored under
serious disabilities from the start. Established in late 1958, they were required
to finish their work and submit a final report by the close of 1959.40 Had that
even been possible, Congress failed to appropriate funds in 1958 or the first
quarter of 1959,41 although the statute had authorized an appropriation of as
much as $75,000.42
The Commission overcame the first problem, securing three successive
extensions of its existence, so that it was finally authorized to operate until
December 31, 1966.' 3 But it never succeeded in prying from the Treasury the
funds necessary for the ambitious work expected of it. Subsisting at first on a
$25,000 loan from the President ($9,000 of which could not be used because it
was not spent or obligated in 1959)," the Commission received only $60,000
in funds appropriated for its work over its lifetime.4 5  Even that figure is
deceptive, because the last appropriation, $25,000 in legislation effective April
30, 1965, was available only until May 1, 196546 and was intended partially to
reimburse Commission staff who had been working without salary, and
otherwise expending their own funds, for more than two years.47
In these circumstances, it should be no surprise that, as Professor Nadelmann
critically observed,' the Commission never got around to the primary task set
for it in the enabling legislation: "draft[ing] for the assistance of the Secretary
of State international agreements to be negotiated by him."49 The surprise is
39. Id. § 2, 72 Stat. at 1743.
40. Id. § 7(b), 72 Stat. at 1745.
41. Act of May 20, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-30, 73 Stat. 33, 43.
42. Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-906, § 8, 72 Stat. 1743, 1745.
43. See Act of Sept. 16, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-287, 73 Stat. 567 (extending Commission's life until
December 31, 1961); Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-324, 75 Stat. 685 (until December 31, 1963);
Act of Aug. 30, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-522, 78 Stat. 700 (until December 31, 1966).
44. See First Annual Report of the Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure 17
(1960) [hereinafter First Annual Report].
45. Act of May 20, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-30, 73 Stat. 33, 43 ($25,000); Act of May 17, 1963, Pub. L.
No. 88-25, 77 Stat. 20, 26 ($10,000); Act of Aug. 30, 1964, Pub. L. No. 89-16, 79 Stat. 81, 91 ($25,000).
46. Act of Apr. 30, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-16, 79 Stat. 81, 91.
47. See 111 CONG. REC. 8532-33 (1965).
48. See Kurt H. Nadelmann, The United States Joins the Hague Conference on Private International
Law, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 291, 309, 323 (Spring 1965) [hereinafter Hague Conference].
49. Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-906, § 2, 72 Stat. 1743, quoted in full, supra text
accompanying note 39.
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rather that the Commission and Advisory Committee accomplished anything
consequential. Indeed, Professor Nadelmann seems to have doubted that those
bodies deserved much credit for reforms that issued under their auspices,
including the legislation passed by Congress in 1964.50
In 1959, when it was unclear whether the Commission's life would be
extended and when it was quite clear that the funds for its work were wholly
inadequate,51 the Advisory Committee recommended, and the Commission
approved, an initial program giving priority "to projects which will be of most
benefit to courts and litigants in this country, and which offer a chance of
substantial accomplishment within the period of the statutory life of the
Commission," treating projects that would require several years for full
treatment "on a 'pilot' basis," and confining "work to projects which will not
require international agreements or treaties and the consequent negotiation with
foreign governments by the Department of State."52  One approved project
called for "a study of the relevant provisions of the United States Code and of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure and draft[ing] proposals for amendments, if necessary.
53
Notwithstanding a $25,000 appropriation in 1959,"4 the Commission would
have needed private funding for even the scaled-down work program adopted
in that year. And that is what, with the President's approval,55 the Commission
sought, securing an arrangement with the Carnegie Corporation and Columbia
Law School "whereby funds would be made available through a research project
of the Columbia Law School to finance the work of the Commission."56
According to that arrangement, Columbia would employ the Commission's
Director and staff as consultants, the Columbia Project on International
Procedure would "make available to the Commission the fruits of its research
and study of existing practices of judicial assistance," and leaders of the
Commission (and Advisory Committee) and of the Columbia Project would
cooperatively determine "the manner in which research conducted for the
benefit of the Commission [would] be undertaken. 57
The fruits of this collaboration included the legislation that is my immediate
concern, as well as amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and a
50. See Nadelmann, Hague Conference, supra note 48, at 323 ("[Ain individual law school
beneficiary of a Foundation grant was largely in control of the work, while on the Commission
membership changed with changing administrations.") (footnote omitted).
51. See supra text accompanying notes 40-47.
52. First Annual Report, supra note 44, at 18; see id. at 21. The program was "for the ensuing two
years." Id. at 5. See also H.R. REP. No. 801, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1959) ("more limited program
... which would afford measurable results within the period of the requested extension").
53. First Annual Report, supra note 44, at 19.
54. See supra note 45.
55. See Second Annual Report of the Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure 2
(1961) [hereinafter Second Annual Report].
56. Id.
57. Id. at 3.
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uniform act.58 When the Carnegie grant to Columbia expired at the end of
1962,5' the Commission could accomplish little further without appropriated or
other funds.' Notwithstanding pleas that the Commission's most important
work-laying the groundwork for international agreements-remained to be
done, Congress was unmoved.6'
The legislation recommended by the Commission and passed by Congress
in 1964 dealt with aspects of judicial assistance in aid of both domestic and
foreign proceedings. Among its provisions were new sections or amendments
to existing law designed to facilitate proof of foreign documents in criminal and
civil actions,62 empowering the State Department to receive and transmit
letters rogatory,63 and empowering district courts to assist in serving documents
"in connection with a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal"' and
in securing testimony and documents for use abroad.65 In language essentially
identical to that used by the Commission's chair when transmitting the proposed
bill, the Senate Judiciary Committee observed:
Until recently, the United States has not engaged itself fully in efforts to improve
practices of international cooperation in litigation. The steadily growing involvement
of the United States in international intercourse and the resulting increase in litigation
with international aspects have demonstrated the necessity for statutory improvements
and other devices to facilitate the conduct of such litigation. Enactment of the bill into
law will constitute a major step in bringing the United States to the forefront of
nations adjusting their procedures to those of sister nations and thereby providing
equitable and efficacious procedures for the benefit of tribunals and litigants involved
in litigation with international aspects.
It is hoped that the initiative taken by the United States in improving its procedures
will invite foreign countries similarly to adjust their procedures.'
In light of Congress's shabby treatment of the Commission,67 it would be
a mistake to read too much into the 1964 legislation, let alone to see in that
legislation an exception for international cases to Congress's traditional inertia
with respect to matters of procedure.' Yet, notwithstanding Professor
58. See Fourth Annual Report of the Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure,
reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 88, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1963) [hereinafter Fourth Annual Report].
59. See id. at 13.
60. See supra text accompanying notes 44-47.
61. See Fourth Annual Report, supra note 58, at 8-14; H.R. REP. No. 1051, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
2, 4 (1963); 111 CONG. REC. 8530-33 (1965); see also infra text accompanying note 313.
62. See Act of Oct. 3, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-619, § 2, 78 Stat. at 995 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3491);
id. § 5(a), 78 Stat. at 996 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1741); id. § 7(a), 78 Stat. at 996 (amending 28 U.S.C.
§ 1745).
63. See id. § 8(a), 78 Stat. at 996-97 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1781).
64. Id. § 4(a), 78 Stat. at 995 (adding 28 U.S.C. § 1696).
65. See id. § 9(a), 78 Stat. at 997 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1782).
66. S. REP. No. 1580, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1964). Compare with id. at 13 (letter from Oscar Cox,
Chairman, to Hon. John W. MacCormack, May 28, 1965). See also H.R. REP. No. 1052, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. 3, 4 (1964).
67. See supra text accompanying notes 40-47, 59-61; infra text accompanying note 313.
68. In connection with the amendment of 28 U.S.C. § 1782, two commentators have noted:
Congress played no role in redrafting the statute. Rather, the new draft was written entirely
by an advisory committee and adopted summarily. Instead of reviewing the bill for
substantive accuracy, Congress merely adopted the drafters' report as legislative history.
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Nadelmann's suggestion to the contrary,69 the legislation recommended by the
Commission (as well as the rest of its work) appears to have been the product
of a truly collaborative effort among the Commission, its Advisory Committee,
and the Columbia Project.7" Ironically, in light of the policies animating the
Commission's stated program,71 the legislation gave more to foreign litigants
and tribunals in need of judicial assistance than it did to domestic litigants and
tribunals. Other changes in domestic law stimulated by the Commission, which
were brought to Congress's attention, redressed the imbalance to some
extent.72  The imbalance may not have mattered, however, because both the
executive branch and the private sector supported the proposed legislation;
73
moreover, the legislation was not controversial, and it issued from a representa-
tive body established by Congress, and advised, as Congress directed, by a
distinguished committee of experts.
Whoever deserves credit (or blame) for the 1964 legislation enlarging the
powers of our courts and State Department to provide and secure assistance in
aid of international litigation, the legislation has affected this country's
subsequent efforts to fashion arrangements for international civil litigation
satisfactory to us and to other countries.
B. Federal Court Rulemaking
1. The Original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The original Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure contained very few special provisions for international civil
litigation.74 This is not surprising, as the great increase in international civil
litigation came after World War 11. 71 It is also not surprising because a major
goal of the 1934 Enabling Act was uniformity among federal district courts.76
The rulemakers pursued that goal by fashioning rules that were not only
uniform in that sense but also trans-substantive, that is, uniformly applicable to
Brian E. Bomstein & Julie M. Levitt, Note, Much Ado About 1782: A Look at Recent Problems with
Discovery in the United States for Use in Foreign Litigation Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, 20 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 429, 439 (1989) (footnotes omitted).
69. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
70. See Second Annual Report, supra note 55, at 3-9; Third Annual Report of the Commission on
International Rules of Judicial Procedure 3-9 (1962) [hereinafter Third Annual Report].
71. See supra text accompanying note 52.
72. See Hans Smit, International Litigation Under the United States Code, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1015,
1035 (1965); infra text accompanying notes 90-95. For the Commission's role in the 1963 and 1966
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see infra text accompanying notes 80-85. Rule
4(i) "was part of an integrated package, some of which was passed by Congress and signed by the
President, and all of which was specifically brought to Congress's attention." Stephen B. Burbank, The
World in Our Courts, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1456, 1484 (1991) (footnote omitted) (book review).
73. See H.R. REP. No. 1052, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1964).
74. See 308 U.S. 645, 700 (1938) (FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b)); id. at 712-13 (FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e)); id.
at 719-20 (FED. R. Civ. P. 44(a)); id. at 722 (FED. R. Civ. P. 45 (e)(2)).
75. See Benjamin Kaplan, Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1961-1963 (I), 77
HARV. L. REV. 601, 635 (1964); supra text accompanying note 36.
76. See S. REP. No. 1174,69th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1926); Burbank, supra note 8, at 1050-98; Stephen
B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA.
L. REV. 1925, 1929 (1989).
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every type of civil action in the federal courts.7 7  Separate (or different)
provisions for international civil litigation would have derogated from this
scheme.
2. The 1963 Amendments. Those concerned about the inadequacy of our
mechanisms for seeking and providing assistance in aid of international civil
litigation recognized that some provisions in the Federal Rules on such matters
as service were an invitation to disaster for litigants using them abroad, whether
immediately or when it came time to enforce a judgment.78 They also
recognized that the few provisions in the Rules specifically treating litigation
with international aspects failed to capture either the reality of foreign law and
practice, or the potential for effective judicial assistance, or both.79
As we have seen, even before the Commission on International Rules of
Judicial Procedure and its Advisory Committee linked up with the Columbia
Project on International Procedure, the Commission had decided, as one of its
initial projects, to consider revisions in federal statutes and rules.' Targeted
for study in the Commission's First Annual Report were Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 4, 28, 29, and 44.81 Once the collaboration with the Columbia
Project was established, "it was decided that the staffs of both the Commission
and the Columbia Project should undertake on a priority basis a study of
desirable changes in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and in Federal
statutes." 2 In connection with that stated priority, the Commission's Second
Annual Report noted that a member of the Advisory Committee, Judge Albert
Maris, was also chair of the Judicial Conference Committee charged with
recommending amendments to the Federal Rules. 83  It also reported that
"[a]rrangements for cooperation"' had been made with the reporters of the
relevant rules committees.
This collaboration yielded the addition of Rule 4(i) ("Alternative Provisions
for Service in a Foreign Country") and amendments to Rule 28(b) ("Persons
Before Whom Depositions May Be Taken") in 1963, and amendments to Rule
44 ("Proof of Official Record") and the addition of Rule 44.1 ("Determination
of Foreign Law") in 1966.85 The 1963 amendments sought to provide litigants
77. See Burbank, supra note 76, at 1934-35. The major exceptions were Rules 64 and 69, dealing
with provisional and final remedies, both of which require reference to state law. For the reasons, see
Burbank, supra note 8, at 1145-47.
78. See First Annual Report, supra note 44, at 12, 19; Jones, supra note 6, at 534-37; Kaplan, supra
note 75, at 635; Smit, supra note 72, at 1032-43.
79. See Ronan E. Degnan, Obtaining Witnesses and Documents (or Things), 108 F.R.D. 223,226-27
(1986); Jones, supra note 6, at 517-22; Smit, supra note 24, at 1053-59.
80. See supra text accompanying note 53.
81. First Annual Report, supra note 44, at 19.
82. Second Annual Report, supra note 55, at 3.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 7. See also Third Annual Report, supra note 70, at 4 (Commission's drafting
subcommittee "maintains a liaison with" the Civil Rules Advisory Committee).
85. See Fourth Annual Report, supra note 58, at 55-70; 374 U.S. 861, 877-78 (1963) (FED. R. Civ.
P. 4(i)); id. at 883-84 (FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b)); 383 U.S. 1029, 1053-54 (1966) (FED. R. Civ. P. 44); id.
at 1055 (FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1).
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in our courts with greater flexibility in serving process and taking evidence
abroad.
The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 4(i) pointed out that "[s]ervice
abroad may be considered by a foreign country to require the performance of
judicial, and therefore 'sovereign,' acts within its territory, which that country
may conceive to be offensive 'to its policy or contrary to its law."'' 6 It also
noted the risk that service in violation of foreign law might render a judgment
unenforceable in that country or even lead to sanctions against the process
server.87 The provision itself, however, merely presented an array of alterna-
tives in addition to those available under other sections of Rule 4. A lawyer
unfamiliar with the pitfalls of foreign service would thus have needed to be
aware of the note in order for the rule usefully to "clarify the provisions
governing service upon parties in foreign countries."'  Moreover, according
to a 1992 decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
a federal district court was powerless to direct, although presumably it could
seek to influence, a litigant to use a particular alternative.89
By (1) permitting service in violation of foreign law (and, in the view of
some countries, of international law),' (2) failing adequately to assist lawyers
in making an informed choice among alternatives, and (3) neglecting to
empower the courts to require resort to another alternative when that would
benefit international relations, Rule 4(i) hardly reflected "due regard for the
sensibilities of foreign governments."'" Rather, just as many of the 1964
legislative amendments represented a unilateral grant of judicial assistance in aid
of litigation abroad,92 Rule 4(i) represented a unilateral assertion of power in
aid of litigation in the federal courts, affording great flexibility but not requiring
deference to foreign law or consideration of the international implications of
service. Indeed, although the reporter of the 1963 amendments acknowledged
that this country should "show some initiative in the international 'unification'
of private law in which we have been notably laggard,, 93 he argued that "it
would be quixotic to remit the problem of foreign service to a solution which
could be attained, if it is attainable at all, only over a period of many years.
'" 94
He also opined that "[t]he adoption of rule 4(i) need not inhibit efforts to
achieve international arrangements if the goal is thought worthy of the effort."95




89. See Umbenhauer v. Woog, 969 F.2d 25, 30 (3d Cir. 1992).
90. See Burbank, supra note 72, at 1476-77, 1483. Cf. id. at 1490 (taking evidence abroad).
91. Smit, supra note 72, at 1018; see Burbank, supra note 72, at 1483.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
93. Kaplan, supra note 75, at 636 (footnote omitted).
94. Id.
95. Id. (emphasis added). A suggestion of doubt on that score is curious given Congress's stated
priorities in establishing the Commission and Advisory Committee on International Rules of Judicial
Procedure. See supra text accompanying note 39.
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Whatever their defects and impact on subsequent international lawmaking,
the 1963 amendments to the Federal Rules were the product of collaboration
between a statutory Commission and Advisory Committee and those assisting
the Supreme Court in the formulation of national court rules under the
Enabling Act. Moreover, although the Enabling Act did not then, and does not
now, either require congressional approval or contemplate review by the
executive branch before Federal Rules become effective,' the Commission
brought the existence of these proposals to the attention of both.' Finally,
whatever gaps there may have been in the rulemakers' knowledge of, or
experience in, international civil litigation or foreign law, the Commission and
its Advisory Committee, as well as the leadership of the Columbia Project,
included a number of individuals who, by training or experience, were experts
in the area.98
3. Recent proposals to amend the Federal Rules. The rulemakers have recently
returned to consideration of the needs of international civil litigation, prompted
in part by this country's adherence to the Service and Evidence Conventions in
the years since the Judicial Code and the Federal Rules were amended
unilaterally to provide greater judicial assistance in cases having international
aspects. Their efforts have been controversial and hence protracted." The
British government protested proposed amendments to Rules 4, 26, and 28
when they were before the Supreme Court,"°° and the Court took the unusual
step of sending the proposals back for further consideration. 1 ' The controver-
sy continued, resulting in a decision by the Judicial Conference's Standing
Committee to delete one of the products of the Advisory Committee's
reconsideration, a proposed amendment to Rule 26.12 Rule 4 underwent last-
minute surgery. Although the amendments became effective, it remains to be
seen whether the operation was successful.'0 3
96. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2074 (1988); Burbank, supra note 8, at 1102, 1177-79, 1196 n.779;
Burbank, supra note 72, at 1483.
97. See supra text accompanying note 72.
98. See Fourth Annual Report, supra note 58, at ix-xvi (listing members and former members of
the Commission and Advisory Committee).
99. For discussion and criticism of the Advisory Committee's proposals to amend Rules 4 and 26
as of May 1991, see Burbank, supra note 72, at 1484-90, 1494-96.
100. See United Kingdom Embassy Note No. 63, transmitted by letter from Hon. Edwin D.
Williamson, Legal Adviser, Department of State, to Hon. William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the
United States (April 19, 1991) [hereinafter United Kingdom Embassy Note] (copy on file with author).
101. Letter from William K. Suter, Clerk of the Supreme Court, to L. Ralph Meecham, Secretary
of the Judicial Conference (Dec. 11, 1991) (returning proposed amendments to Rules 4, 4.1, 12, 26, 28,
30, and 71A and enclosing Williamson letter and United Kingdom Embassy Note, supra note 100) (copy
on file with author). See also H.R. Doc. No. 102-77, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. III (1991) (Letter from Hon.
William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the United States, to Hon. Thomas S. Foley, Speaker, United
States House of Representatives (April 30, 1991)) [hereinafter HOUSE Doc.].
102. See Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 8 n.1
(Agenda E-19, September 1992) [hereinafter Standing Committee Report] (copy on file with author).
This action obviated the objection to the proposed amendment to Rule 28(b). See United Kingdom
Embassy Note, supra note 100.
103. See infra text accompanying notes 114-18, 128.
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Criticism of the proposed amendments to Rule 4 centered on two provisions,
one that, as originally approved by the Standing Committee after reconsidera-
tion, would have extended a proposed waiver of service mechanism (with cost
sanctions if a defendant refused to waive service without good cause) to
situations in which service had to be made in a foreign country,' °4 and the
other including as an alternative for service upon individuals in a foreign
country "other means not prohibited by international agreement as may be
directed by the court.
10 5
a. Waiver of service. As to the waiver of service mechanism, it was objected
that, if extended abroad, it would violate the policy of some foreign govern-
ments prohibiting waivers, that it would infringe upon foreign sovereignty, that
a waiver made in the face of a cost sanction is not consensual, and that the
provision would violate the Service Convention, at least if implemented in a
country that was a party to that treaty and that did not approve service by
mail. " The Advisory Committee attempted to meet such objections,
asserting:
It is hoped that, since transmission of the notice and waiver forms is a private nonjudicial act,
does not purport to effect service, and is not accompanied by any summons or directive from
a court, use of the procedure will not offend foreign sovereignties, even those that have
withheld their assent to formal service by mail or have objected to the "service-by-mail"
provisions of the former rule. Unless the addressee consents, receipt of the request under the
revised rule does not give rise to any obligation to answer the lawsuit, does not provide a basis
for default judgment, and does not suspend the statute of limitations in those states where the
period continues to run until service. The only adverse consequence to the foreign defendant
is one shared by domestic defendants; namely, the potential imposition of costs of service that,
if successful in the litigation, it would not otherwise have to bear. However, this shifting of
expense would not be proper under the rule if the foreign defendant's refusal to waive service
was based upon a policy of its government prohibiting all waivers of service.0 7
The Advisory Committee also stressed the "distinct advantages"'1 8 of
waiver for a foreign defendant and attempted to meet the specific objections of
the British government by asserting that "there will be little reason for a plain-
tiff"" to use the waiver mechanism, rather than formal service under the
Hague Convention, in countries like the United Kingdom. Finally, the
Committee also indicated that good cause not to shift costs would exist if a
defendant refusing to waive "was located in a foreign country whose laws or
104. See Proposed Rule 4(d), Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
Forms Submitted to the Judicial Conference of the United States by Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure 6-9 (Agenda E-19, September 1992) [hereinafter Standing Committee Proposals]
(copy on file with author).
105. Proposed Rule 4(f)(3), Standing Committee Proposals, supra note 104, at 12.
106. See Burbank, supra note 72, at 1485-86; Comments on Proposed Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: Proposed Revisions to Rule 4(d) (Service of Process on Individuals in
Foreign States) and to Rule 26(a)(5) (Extraterritorial Discovery) 2-3, transmitted by letter from Hon.
Stuart M. Gerson, Assistant U.S. Attorney General, to Joseph F. Spaniol, Secretary, Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure (April 6, 1992) [hereinafter Executive Branch Comments] (copy on
file with author); United Kingdom Embassy Note, supra note 100.
107. Standing Committee Proposals, supra note 104, at 28.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 29.
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policies prohibited its residents from waiving service of formal judicial process
even from its own courts."'".
It is heartening to see the change in tone that has marked successive versions
of the Advisory Committee's attempt to justify the extension of waiver of
service to defendants abroad. Such a change is evident in language stressing the
advantages that the opportunity for waiver may hold for a foreign defendant.
Perhaps more important, the Committee's Note has become more conciliatory,
no longer confidently asserting that the proposed Rule should not offend
reasonable foreign governments,"1 which was the tone of those responsible for
the 1963 amendments.11 2 Of course, in the meantime the rulemakers had
learned how some foreign governments in fact reacted to their proposal."
3
Even more heartening is the last-minute and extraordinary decision of the
Standing Committee 4 to reverse itself and to recommend that the Judicial
Conference approve an alternative version of Rule 4 that made cost-shifting for
refusal to waive service applicable only if the plaintiff and defendant are both
located in the United States." 5  The decision was extraordinary because it
followed the meeting of the full Committee at which the extension of cost-
shifting to defendants located in foreign countries was approved over dis-
sents,11 6 and because it was a direct result of a subsequent meeting (in
September 1992) of the Chairs of the Advisory and Standing Committees with
representatives of the Departments of State and Justice and of the British
Embassy.' The Judicial Conference accepted the revised recommendation,
110. Id. at 30 (emphasis added). Passing what it means for a foreign government to "prohibit"
waiver of service, the Advisory Committee would have required that the prohibition extend to all cases,
including those that were wholly domestic. The notion seems to have been that a government policy
prohibiting only waivers sought in litigation abroad did not count. That is a notion as puzzling as the
argument, advanced in connection with the reform proposals of thirty years ago, that treated as specious
foreign objections to the unilateral acts of other countries when those same acts were permitted by
treaty. See Burbank, supra note 72, at 1486 n.177.
111. The Advisory Committee Note to the proposed amendment to Rule 4 that was submitted to,
and returned by, the Supreme Court asserted that "[b]ecause the transmission of the waiver does not
purport to effect service except by consent, the transmission of a request for consent sent to a foreign
country gives no reasonable offense to foreign sovereignty, even to foreign governments that have
withheld their assent to service by mail." Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
30 (1990) (emphasis added), quoted in Burbank, supra note 72, at 1485. For the full text of the
proposed rule and note, see HOUSE Doc., supra note 101, at 61-102.
112. See Kaplan, supra note 75, at 637; Smit, supra note 72, at 1018. For criticism of that tone, see
Burbank, supra note 72, at 1486; Nadelmann, supra note 48, at 310-11 n.141.
113. See supra text accompanying note 100.
114. See letter from Hon. Robert E. Keeton, Chairman, Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, to Hon. Stuart M. Gerson, Assistant U.S. Attorney General (Oct. 6, 1992) [hereinafter
Keeton Letter] (copy on file with author).
115. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Forms 8-9 (Nov. 27, 1992)
[hereinafter Judicial Conference Proposals] (copy on file with author). Cost-shifting applies only if "a
defendant located within the United States fails to comply with a request for waiver made by a plaintiff
located within the United States." Id. at 8.
116. See Standing Committee Report, supra note 102, at 8 n.2.
117. See Keeton Letter, supra note 114.
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which was subsequently promulgated by the Supreme Court and went into effect
on December 1, 1993.118
Changes in tone and the deletion of cost-shifting when either the plaintiff or
defendant is not located in the United States notwithstanding, amended Rule
4 may not escape adverse foreign reaction.9 The rulemakers' assertions
about the nature of the waiver of service mechanism and their expressed hopes
are in the note; with the admittedly significant exception of cost-shifting, the
rule remains essentially the same." One may still question whether a private
litigant has the power to waive her country's sovereignty objections,121 and
whether more than an assertion (or a label) distinguishes a waiver mechanism
that requires transmission abroad of a copy of the complaint and an official
form from formal service of process.
22
Thus, the changes that have been made may not satisfy foreign governments
that prohibit service by mail from abroad, including those that have made a
reservation under Article 10(a) of the Service Convention. 3 After all, it is
118. See Judicial Conference Proposals, supra note 115, at 8-9; Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 113 S. Ct. 475 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Amendments]. For a description of the legislative
process by which these amendments became effective, see William J. Hughes, Congressional Reaction
to the 1993 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 18 SETON HALL LEG. J. 1 (1993).
119. See Statement of Gary B. Born before the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Chicago, Illinois,
Feb. 2, 1990, at 24-26 [hereinafter Born Statement] (copy on file with author); letter from Hon. Edmund
Hosker, First Secretary (Commercial) of the British Embassy, to Joseph F. Spaniol, Jr., Secretary,
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Apr. 9, 1992) [hereinafter 1992 British Letter] (copy
on file with author).
120. Unfortunately, in revising the note to reflect the deletion of cost-shifting when either the
plaintiff or the defendant is not located in the United States, the rulemakers failed to clean up the
introductory paragraph to subdivision (d):
Subdivision (d). This text is new, but is substantially derived from the former subdivisions (c)
(2) (C) and (D), added to the rule by Congress in 1983. The aims of the provision are to
eliminate the costs of service of a summons on many parties and to foster cooperation among
adversaries and counsel. The rule operates to impose upon the defendant those costs that could
have been avoided if the defendant had cooperated reasonably in the manner prescribed. This
device is useful in dealing with defendants who are furtive, who reside in places not easily
reached by process servers, or who are outside the United States and can be served only at
substantial and unnecessary expense. Illustratively, there is no useful purpose achieved by
requiring a plaintiff to comply with all the formalities of service in a foreign country, including
costs of translation, when suing a defendant manufacturer, fluent in English, whose products are
widely distributed in the United States. See Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corp., 889 F. 2d 172 (8th
Cir. 1989).
1993 Amendments, supra note 118, 113 S. Ct. at 634-35 (emphasis added). See 1992 British Letter,
supra note 119, at 1-2.
121. See Burbank, supra note 72, at 1485; letter from Hon. Edwin D. Williamson, Legal Adviser,
Department of State, to Joseph F. Spaniol, Jr., Secretary, Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure (June 12, 1992) [hereinafter State Department Letter] (copy on file with author).
122. See letter from Professor George Rutherglen to Hon. Joseph R. Weis, Jr., Chairman, Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 3 (Aug. 24, 1990) ("Only an attorney could distinguish between
receipt of the request for waiver, which has already occurred, and formal service, which is to be
waived.") (copy on file with author).
123. "Provided the State of destination does not object, the present Convention shall not interfere
with (a) the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad."
Hague Service Convention, supra note 2, art. 10(a), 20 U.S.T. at 363, 658 U.N.T.S. at 169. "[W]hether
a failure to make a reservation with respect to article 10(a) of the Convention constitutes consent to
service by mail is a matter on which U.S. courts are divided." Burbank, supra note 72, at 1486-87
(footnotes omitted).
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our State Department's view that, with or without cost-shifting, "[a] United
States provision authorizing 'waiver of service' . . . does not conform to formal
service of process which was intended by the Hague Service Convention."'24
The rulemakers' notion that plaintiffs will prefer formal service under the
Convention to waiver of service "in a foreign country like the United King-
dom"'25 is wishful thinking. In any event, like the 1963 amendment to Rule
4,126 the waiver option presupposes a high degree of sophistication on the part
of plaintiffs' lawyers and leaves the choice to them.127 Given the history and
content of critical comments, it might have been prudent to exempt internation-
al civil litigation from the waiver mechanism until such time as -the rulemakers
could study the results of the survey of foreign governments that the State
Department agreed to conduct after the September 1992 meeting.
128
The rulemakers' persistence in this matter is unfortunate for reasons other
than the likelihood that it will provoke additional controversy. Insistence on the
availability of the waiver mechanism for use in foreign countries where it is not
permitted is inconsistent with three of the major advances made in the 1993
amendments to Rule 4. One of those advances, bespeaking concern for
international cooperation and a willingness to subordinate unilateral assertions
of power, reposes in amended Rule 4(f), under which "[s]ervice by methods that
would violate foreign law is not generally authorized.' ' 129 Another consists in
the greater clarity, coherence, and guidance provided by amended Rule 4(f),
which replaces a hodge-podge of alternatives seemingly available for service
abroad 3°--some of them that were not perhaps available' and others
dangerous to use 3 2-with an exclusive list of options that should reduce the
dangers for unsophisticated litigants and attorneys. The third and related
advance lies in drawing attention to the Service Convention and other similar
treaties that may apply.1
33
The rulemakers' persistence is also unfortunate because, in addition to
rejecting foreign protests against the extension of the proposed waiver of service
mechanism abroad, they rejected the positions of the Departments of Justice
and State, which also opposed the extension. 13' Some members of the
124. Executive Branch Comments, supra note 106, at 3. See Born Statement, supra note 119, at 25
n.33; letter from Michael Hoenig, Esq., to Hon. Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure, 3-5 (March 15, 1990) (copy on file with author).
125. 1993 Amendments, supra note 118, 113 S. Ct. at 637 (Rule 4(d) advisory committee note).
126. See supra text accompanying note 88.
127. See Executive Branch Comments, supra note 106, at 3 ("The 'waiver of service' provision will
mislead litigants into believing that proper service has been made for the purpose of enforcing resulting
United States judgments in foreign jurisdictions.").
128. See Peter H. Pfund, Remarks, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 160 (Summer 1994).
129. 1993 Amendments, supra note 118, 113 S. Ct. at 642 (Rule 4(f) advisory committee note).
130. See supra text accompanying note 88.
131. See, e.g., Umbenhauer v. Woog, 969 F.2d 25, 30 n.5 (3d Cir. 1992) ("[W]e need not decide
whether process may ever properly be served on a foreign defendant under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii).").
132. See supra text accompanying notes 86-87.
133. But see infra text accompanying notes 148-59 (criticizing interpretations of Service Convention
in Advisory Committee Note to amended Rule 4(f)(3)).
134. See Executive Branch Comments, supra note 106.
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Advisory Committee apparently discounted executive branch objections because
they emerged only after foreign governments protested. 135 The fear was also
expressed that to yield to the protests would be to politicize the rulemaking
process.136 Moreover, the Advisory Committee may have taken comfort in the
notion that Congress could change the proposal if it deemed the objections
serious.137 The Standing Committee's change of position on cost-shifting is to
be applauded, but although not too late, it may be too little.'38
What, then, has motivated the rulemakers to cling to a provision the
premises and assumptions of which have been repeatedly questioned and which
has been, and may still be, controversial both in foreign countries, including
some of our treaty partners, and in that branch of the federal government
primarily charged with the conduct of foreign relations? First, there was
impatience with the unjustified imposition of cost and delay, problems that may
be especially serious in international civil litigation. 39 Second, there was a
normative view that litigants from foreign countries should be treated the same
as domestic litigants unless there are very good reasons to treat them
differently,4 ° a view that can color interpretations of international agree-
ments.'4' Third, the rulemakers apparently do not regard either foreign law,
customary international law, or the Hague Convention as providing such reasons
where the question is waiver of service. Finally, some members of the Advisory
Committee do not take seriously executive branch objections that they deem
merely reactive, and they may discount such objections when the executive
branch fails to speak with one voice or appears to change position.'42
b. Court-directed service. The other controversial provision in the 1993
amendments to Rule 4 that addresses problems in international civil litigation
permits service upon individuals in a foreign country "by other means not
135. See Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules, Minutes of Meeting, Apr. 13-15, 1992, at 5
[hereinafter April 1992 Minutes] (copy on file with author).
136. See id.
137. See id. at 4-5.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 120-29.
139. See supra note 120.
140. See April 1992 Minutes, supra note 135, at 5 (Advisory Committee member "concluded that
the Justice-State-British Embassy position is basically unfair").
141. See id. at 4 ("It seems unlikely that Congress intended to give a benefit to foreign defendants
that it would not give to domestic defendants."). In context, this appears to be a reference to the
supposed intent of the Senate in consenting to the Service Convention. See also id. at 9-10; infra text
accompanying notes 191-95.
142. See April 1992 Minutes, supra note 135, at 5; see also id. at 9 (Rule 26). In an attachment to
the letter from the Chair of Advisory Committee on Civil Rules to the Chair of the Standing
Committee that identified and discussed criticisms and explained changes made by the Advisory
Committee, the matter was put as follows concerning Rule 4:
The Department of Justice, which had expressed no comment when the rule was originally
proposed, has subsequently taken the position, essentially echoing concerns of the Department
of State, that, to avoid possible offense to other governments, it would be preferable for the
rule to restrict the request-for-waiver procedure to defendants located within this country.
Standing Committee Proposals, supra note 104, Appendix E, Attachment B, at 1.
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prohibited by international agreement as may be directed by the court."'43
This is a stop-gap measure designed to deal with unusual cases, including cases
in which the court determines that service will require a violation of foreign
law.'" Although not objectionable on its face, its drafting history reveals, and
the Advisory Committee Note confirms, that it reflects flawed premises,
including erroneous interpretations of the Service Convention. That same
history reveals successive decisions to remit controversial interpretations to the
Note.
In an earlier version the amended rule would have permitted a court to
direct service "by means not authorized by international agreement or not
consistent with the law of a foreign country, if the court finds that international-
ly agreed means or the law of a foreign country (A) will not provide a lawful
means by which service can be effected, or (B) in cases of urgency, will not
permit service within the time required by the circumstances."' 45 I criticized
that formulation both for lack of candor and for conflict with the Service
Convention. 46 The rulemakers have sought to make clear that the latest
version does not permit violation of an international agreement, 147 but they
have also adhered to the view that the Hague Convention authorizes alternate
methods of service in circumstances where, fairly interpreted, it does not do so.
According to the Advisory Committee, the "Hague Convention does not
specify a time within which a foreign country's Central Authority must effect
service, but Article 15 does provide that alternate methods may be used if a
Central Authority does not respond within six months.' ' 148  Taking that
position, the rulemakers cite as one possible occasion for use of alternate
methods of service under amended Rule 4(f)(3) "the failure of the foreign
country's Central Authority to effect service within the six-month period
provided by the Convention.'
149
143. 1993 Amendments, supra note 118, 113 S. Ct. at 485 (Rule 4 (f)(3)). Still another controversial
provision is not explicitly directed at international civil litigation but would have its major impact there.
Rule 4(k)(2) provides:
If the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States,
serving a summons or filing a waiver of service is also effective, with respect to claims arising
under federal law, to establish personal jurisdiction over the person of any defendant who is
not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of general jurisdiction of any state.
Id. at 490. For discussion, see Burbank, supra note 72, at 1484 n.164. See infra note 347; text
accompanying notes 349-51.
144. 1993 Amendments, supra note 118, 113 S. Ct. at 643 (Rule 4(f) advisory committee note).
145. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12-13 (1990), quoted in Burbank,
supra note 72, at 1489. For the full text of the proposed rule and note, see HOUSE DOC., supra note
101, at 61-102.
146. See Burbank, supra note 72, at 1489-90.
147. See April 1992 Minutes, supra note 135, at 5. There may, however, still be room for argument
whether a method not authorized is prohibited. Cf. Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules, Minutes
of Civil Rules Committee Meeting, New York City, June 6-8, 1990 at 10 (Rule 26) [hereinafter June
1990 Minutes] (copy on file with author). But see infra text accompanying note 156 (Hague Service
Convention is exclusive and therefore prohibits what it does not authorize).
148. 1993 Amendments, supra note 118, 113 S. Ct. at 642 (Rule 4(f) advisory committee note).
149. Id. at 643.
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Article .15 does not "provide that alternate methods may be used if a Central
Authority does not respond within six months." The article's only textual
reference to "six months" appears in paragraphs enabling contracting states to
make a formal declaration that would permit the entry of default judgments in
the absence of proof of service under certain conditions.5 ° The first of those
conditions is that "the document was transmitted by one of the methods
provided for in this Convention.'' 1 The second is that "a period of time of
not less than six months, considered adequate by the judge in the particular
case, has elapsed since the date of the transmission of the document."'52
Nothing in the negotiating history contradicts the language of Article 15 or
supports the Advisory Committee's interpretation,'53 nor do descriptions of
the Convention during the ratification process.'54 The way to deal with
difficulties in effecting service under the Hague Convention is through
diplomatic channels,'55 not through unilateral resort to means that it does not
150. Article 15 provides:
Where a writ of summons or an equivalent document had to be transmitted abroad for the
purpose of service, under the provisions of the present Convention, and the defendant has not
appeared, judgment shall not be given until it is established that-
(a) the document was served by a method prescribed by the internal law of
the State addressed for the service of documents in domestic actions
upon persons who are within its territory, or
(b) the document was actually delivered to the defendant or to his residence
by another method provided for by this Convention,
and that in either of these cases the service or the delivery was effected in sufficient time to
enable the defendant to defend.
Each Contracting State shall be free to declare that the judge, notwithstanding the
provisions of the first paragraph of this article, may give judgment even if no certificate of
service or delivery has been received, if all the following conditions are fulfilled-
(a) the document was transmitted by one of the methods provided for in this
Convention,
(b) a period of time of not less than six months, considered adequate by the
judge in the particular case, has elapsed since the date of the transmis-
sion of the document,
(c) no certificate of any kind has been received, even though every
reasonable effort has been made to obtain it through the competent
authorities of the State addressed.
Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraphs the judge may order, in case
of urgency, any provisional or protective measures.
Hague Service Convention, supra note 2, art. 15, 20 U.S.T. at 364, 658 U.N.T.S. at 171-73.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See, e.g., Conference de La Haye de Droit International Privd, III ACRES ET DOCUMENTS DE
LA DIXIEME SESSION, 92-98, 114-15, 125-26, 129, 133, 251-63, 267-70, 314, 321, 337-39, 376-78 (1965)
[hereinafter AcTES ET DOCUMENTS].
154. See S. EXEC. DOc. C, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1967) [hereinafter 1967 SENATE DOCUMENT]
(letter of submittal); id. at 21 (report of U.S. delegation); S. EXEC. REP. No. 6, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1967) [hereinafter 1967 SENATE REPORT]; id. at 14-15 (statement of Philip W. Amram). The Chief
of the U.S. delegation subsequently described this part of Article 15 as follows: "However, a
Contracting State may reserve the right to allow the Court entry of judgment in the absence of proof
of service, if six months have elapsed since the date of transmission and all reasonable efforts have been
made to obtain proof of service." Richard D. Kearney, The United States and International Cooperation
to Unify Private Law, 5 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 5 (1972).
155. This view was expressed by the Executive Branch in its comments:
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authorize and, hence, as the exclusive source of rules among signatory states,
prohibits.156
Similarly, the Advisory Committee Note to amended Rule 4(f)(3) asserts
that "[t]he Hague Convention ... authorizes special forms of service in cases
of urgency if convention methods will not permit service within the time
required by the circumstances."' 57  The rulemakers apparently relied on
another provision in Article 15, that "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of the
preceding paragraphs the judge may order, in case of urgency, any provisional
or protective measures.' ' 158 On its face, this language means simply that, even
though Article 15 constrains the entry of a default judgment, it does not prohibit
''provisional or protective measures" such as injunctions or attachments of
property "in case of urgency." Nothing in that language provides a general
authorization for alternate methods of service in such cases, and neither does
anything in the negotiating history.'59
The Advisory Committee was made aware of the dubiety of these
interpretations during the comment period. Unfortunately, one commentator
who was attentive to some of the problems"6° was more interested in ensuring
that alternate methods would be available for other situations,' and he was
sanguine about occasional violations of the Hague Convention pursuant to a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.6 2 Other commentators simply asserted that
Article 14 of the Service Convention states that any difficulties in connection with the
transmission of judicial documents for service shall be settled through diplomatic channels.
In fact, some of the problems outlined in the Advisory Committee Notes, such as refusal of
certain foreign central authorities to serve complaints with punitive damage counts, have been
satisfactorily resolved as a result of meetings of representatives of states party to the Service
Convention under the auspices of the Hague Conference on Private International Law.
Executive Branch Comments, supra note 106, at 4; see also Born Statement, supra note 119, at 19 n.25;
United Kingdom Embassy Note, supra note 100.
156. See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988); Executive Branch
Comments, supra note 106, at 2; infra note 162.
157. 1993 Amendments, supra note 118, 113 S. Ct. at 643.
158. Supra note 150.
159. See ACTES ET DOCUMENTS, supra note 153, at 98, 115, 129,270, 321,337-39, 378. The provision
was not the subject of comment or discussion in the documents submitted to the Senate when its
consent was sought. See 1967 SENATE DOCUMENT, supra note 154; 1967 SENATE REPORT, supra note
154. Note, however, R. H. Graveson, The Tenth Session of the Hague Conference of Private
International Law, 14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 528, 540 (1965) ("Furthermore, the reservation is made for
jurisdiction in case of urgency to take provisional or protective measures") (emphasis added). See
Burbank, supra note 72, at 1489-90 n.200.
160. This commentator noted that,
[a]lthough Article 15 refers to a six month period for service under the Convention, I suspect
that this period was probably intended to be confined to cases involving default judgments
against defendants who evade service. If so, the new Rule 4(f) would permit service in
violation of the Convention and thus would be likely to produce unenforceable U.S. judgments
and might also prompt retaliatory measures by foreign states.
Born Statement, supra note 119, at 19.
161. See id. at 20-21. Subsequently, "[tihe addendum for emergencies suggested by Mr. Born was
approved as a fit to the Hague Convention, although [two members] questioned the need for such a
provision." June 1990 Minutes, supra note 147, at 9.
162. See Born Statement, supra note 119, at 19-20 & n.26, 20-21 & n.28, 23. So for a time were
members of the Advisory Committee. When concern was expressed that "the rules propose to
authorize service in violation of a treaty ... it was pointed out that some signatories do not obey the
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the Service Convention authorizes resort to alternate methods if a foreign
government is dilatory.63 Moreover, during the initial comment process, both
the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC")'64 and the Department
of Justice 161 pressed for greater flexibility in the use of alternate methods of
service. When the State Department's views finally were expressed, at first
indirectly' 66 and then directly, 67 they were insufficiently specific to prompt
deletion from the note of controversial interpretations that had been eliminated
from the text of the rule."r
The progressive sanitizing of Rule 4(f)(3), by eliminating what might have
been construed as permission to violate a treaty and remitting controversial
interpretations of the Service Convention to the note, was a course consistent
with that advocated by members of the Advisory Committee in connection with
the proposal to amend Rule 26:
And another factor that some members of the Committee were concerned about is
frankly beyond the ken of this Committee, but important, I suppose, and that is
honoring diplomatic efforts that are undertaken and accomplished by other branches
of government and not offending the processes that are set up, for example. And,
frankly, there's a fundamental tension between those kinds of concerns.
And in one respect, one of the people on the Committee-your proposal is
consistent with the view that some members of the Committee had, that we should
express-and that may be the adverb word-express deference to processes that have
been established through other channels and by other branches of government. After
expressing that deference-I don't mean as a complete ritual, but after expressing that
deference, then proceed with what we need to do to do justice. 69
c. Rule 26. Although the rulemakers chose to go forward with, while making
changes in, the controversial provisions in Rule 4, the Standing Committee
eliminated a proposed amendment to Rule 26 regarding discovery abroad 7 '
treaty, and the present rule permits such deviance." June 1990 Minutes, supra note 147, at 9.
163. See, e.g., letter from Edwin R. Alley, Esq., to Hon. James Macklin, Jr., Secretary, Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 2 (Mar. 14, 1990) (copy on file with author).
164. See Statement of Thomas L. Riesenberg, Assistant General Counsel, U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, Washington, D.C., Before the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Chicago, Illinois, Feb. 2, 1990, at 6-16 [hereinafter SEC
Statement] (copy on file with author).
165. See United States Department of Justice, Supplemental Comments on Proposed Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 1-2 (Mar. 15, 1990) [hereinafter DOJ 1990 Comments] (copy
on file with author).
166. See Executive Branch Comments, supra note 106, at 3-4.
167. See State Department Letter, supra note 121.
168. The Standing Committee eliminated from the text of Proposed Rule 4(0(3) the conditional
language, "if the court finds that internationally agreed means or the law of the foreign country (A) will
not provide a lawful means by which service can be effected or (B), in cases of urgency, will not permit
service of process within the time required by the circumstances." Compare Proposed Amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence 8 (May 1992) (copy on file with
author) with Standing Committee Proposals, supra note 104, at 12. It was deleted because it "may have
contributed to controversy and was not needed." Id. Appendix H, at 4 (emphasis added). It was not
needed because the note remained essentially the same.
169. Hearings on the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, San Francisco, California, Jan. 9, 1990, at 86-87 [hereinafter January
1990 Hearing] (copy on file with author).
170. See supra text accompanying note 102.
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that had also been the subject of adverse comment by foreign governments as
well as by the Departments of Justice and State.171  Originally viewed as a
vehicle to codify the position of a minority of the Supreme Court in the
Acrospatiale case 172 by requiring first resort to an applicable convention except
in certain conditions, the proposed amendment had a tortured history
thereafter.'73 In response to negative comments, including those by the
SEC174 and the Justice Department, 17 the Advisory Committee appeared to
change direction, but the Advisory Committee Note was confusing. Ultimately,
in the face of continuing controversy, 176 the Standing Committee apparently
decided that the game was not worth the candle.
Members of the Standing Committee may have felt that, particularly in light
of the Supreme Court's actions in returning some of the earlier proposals and
requesting a report,177 something had to go. The differing perspectives of the
Justice and State Departments at the end of the process 178 mirrored confusion
about the Rule 26 proposal throughout the process. The proposed amendment
to Rule 26 was an attempt to discipline discovery abroad with attention to
international relations. Appearing at first far-reaching, it was watered down to
the point of insignificance. Indeed, the result of the Advisory Committee's volte
face was regarded in some quarters as positively harmful to international
relations.179 In those circumstances, the better part of valor was to preserve
the status quo.
171. See supra text accompanying note 100; Executive Branch Comments, supra note 106, at 5-8;
State Department Letter, supra note 121. For another account of the proposed amendment to Rule
26, see Gary B. Born, The Hague Evidence Convention Revisited: Reflections on its Role in U.S. Civil
Procedure, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77 (Summer 1994).
172. Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. United States Dist. Court for the So. Dist. of
Iowa, 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
173. See Burbank, supra note 72, at 1494-95.
174. See SEC Statement, supra note 164, at 16-19.
175. See DOJ 1990 Comments, supra note 165, at 2-4.
176. See Executive Branch Comments, supra note 106, at 5-8; State Department Letter, supra note
121.
177. The Advisory Committee was informed in February 1992 "that the Court would in the future
like a memorandum explaining the contentious issues resolved." Advisory Committee on the Civil
Rules, Minutes of Meeting of February 21, 1992, at 1 (copy on file with author): Appendix H to the
Judicial Conference Rules materials for September, 1992 is a document entitled "Proposed Rules
Amendments Generating Substantial Controversy."
178. See Executive Branch Comments, supra note 106, at 5-7; April 1992 Minutes, supra note 135,
at 9.
179. See letter from Hon. Adair Dyer, First Secretary of the Permanent Bureau of the Hague
Conference on Private International Law, to Edward R. Alley, Esq. (Aug. 29, 1990), enclosed with letter
from Edward R. Alley, Esq., to Hon. Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure (Sept. 5, 1990) (copies on file with author); State Department Letter, supra note 121
(expressing "great concern" about "discovery in contravention of foreign law or applicable international
convention" and arguing that proposed Rule 26(a)(5) "establishes a standard which encourages U.S.
parties to demonstrate that discovery methods authorized by a treaty are 'inadequate or inequitable'
and thus need not be followed in a given case."); Born, supra note 171, at 92-96.
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C. Federal Judge-Made Law
Professor Hazard has reminded us that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
are not the only source of procedural rules applied by the federal courts."
The observation is as true for federal civil litigation having international aspects
as it is for litigation that is wholly domestic. Apart from procedural law in
statutes, local rules of court, standing orders, and treaties, federal judges have
limited power to create procedural law in their decisions.' 8' Moreover, both
in interpreting existing law that is not created in cases and in filling gaps in it,
federal judges can exercise power that differs only in degree from their power
to fashion common law.t82
Some of the rules that federal judges have fashioned or that are the product
of interpretation are among the most consequential in international civil
litigation, and some of them are associated, rightly or wrongly, with the field of
procedure. Thus, federal judge-made law "interpreting" the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment often determines whether a foreign defendant
can be subjected to the jurisdiction of a state (or federal) court.'83 Moreover,
federal judge-made law will often determine whether international civil litigation
remains in federal court despite an objection of forum non conveniens" or
a motion to dismiss grounded in a contractual forum selection clause specifying
a foreign forum. 85 And again, federal courts may be called upon to interpret
and apply a variety of statutes and rules that regulate, in varying levels of detail,
the incidents of international civil litigation. On occasion, that process requires
mediation between apparently conflicting norms.'86
In previous work, I have examined claims that there is, or should be, a
discrete field of international civil litigation and that special rules apply in such
litigation to problems they share with domestic litigation. Disagreeing with such
claims, I have argued that
[iut seems more accurate to view international civil litigation as part of a process of
cross-fertilization in which (1) doctrine and techniques developed in the context of
domestic cases are brought to bear on problems presented in international litigation,
and (2) the increasingly international dimensions of litigation in our courts prompt
changes in doctrine and techniques, which are then applied in domestic cases."
180. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2244-46 (1989).
181. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
1, 24 (1985).
182. See Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie after the Death of Diversity?, 78
MICH. L. REV. 311, 332-36 (1980).
183. See, e.g., Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97 (1987); Asahi Metal Indus. Co.
v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
184. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
185. See, e.g., M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
186. See, e.g., Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
187. Burbank, supra note 72, at 1459. Of course, "[i]nternational cases in our courts may present
occasions for the application of rules of law that are not pertinent in wholly domestic cases. Act of
state and foreign sovereign immunity ... are two prominent examples." Id. at 1472-73 (footnote
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As I have also pointed out, it would be surprising to find many special rules
of procedure for international civil litigation in federal courts. A major
normative premise of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has been not only
that the same rules should apply in all federal courts but that they should apply
in all cases in those courts. The same quest for uniformity undergirds federal
judge-made procedural law. Substantial controversy now attends the premise
of trans-substantive rules, but its hold is strong.188 Moreover, there are
additional reasons why federal lawmakers may not wish to have special rules of
procedure for international civil litigation.
Some of the 1993 amendments to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure represent a further departure from the norm of trans-substantive
procedure-as for instance by substituting an exclusive menu of methods of
service abroad in place of a list of optional alternatives. 89 Those proposals
cling to the norm, however, in connection with the proposed waiver of service
mechanism, and only extraordinary action by the Standing Committee broke the
mold for cost-shifting.19° One reason, I have suggested, for persistence with
regard to the waiver mechanism has been the view that foreign litigants should
not be treated differently than domestic litigants in the absence of compelling
reasons.191  Different treatment could prompt concern about invidious
discrimination against foreign litigants.192 That, however, is apparently not
what has most concerned the rulemakers. Both in connection with the waiver
of service mechanism193 and in their deliberations on Rule 26,194 members
of the Advisory Committee expressed fear that differences in the rules would
confer an unfair advantage on foreign litigants. Moreover, to the extent that
their efforts have intersected with existing law, whether found in legislation or
treaties, they have been reluctant to conclude that other U.S. lawmakers would
have conferred such advantages. 95 In this, they are echoing attitudes evident
in the decisions of the Supreme Court interpreting the Service and Evidence
Conventions. Neither the decisions nor the attitudes suggest a bright future for
a federal common law of international civil litigation.
If have argued elsewhere that in both Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v.
Schlunk,196 interpreting the Service Convention, and Soci~t, Nationale
Industrielle Agrospatiale v. United States District Court for the Southern District
of Iowa,9 7 interpreting the Evidence Convention, the Court failed to accord
omitted).
188. See id. at 1466-67.
189. See supra text accompanying note 130.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 106-42.
191. See supra text accompanying note 140.
192. See Hearings on the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Chicago, Illinois, Feb. 2, 1990, at 46 (copy on file with author).
193. See supra text accompanying note 140.
194. See April 1992 Minutes, supra note 135, at 9-10; January 1990 Hearing, supra note 169, at 84-85.
195. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
196. 486 U.S. 694 (1988).
197. 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
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those treaties "the respect due an ordinary federal statute." 198 In Agrospatiale,
however, the Court did treat the Evidence Convention like an ordinary federal
statute by refusing seriously to engage the Convention's policies out of concern
for the integrity of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.199 One attitude that
emerges from the opinions is a determination to preserve as much domestic
procedural law as possible, particularly if it reposes in the Federal Rules.
Another, related attitude is reluctance to interpret treaties so as to confer
greater rights on foreign litigants than their domestic opponents. The latter
impulse was so strong in Agrospatiale that it prompted not only speculation
about what our treatymakers would or would not have done2" but also
dubious interpretations of things that they in fact had done.201
The Supreme Court has, of course, counseled special concern for the
interests of foreign litigants and the need for smooth international relations,2"2
and it did so in Agrospatiale.2 °3 In addition, the Court has on occasion
expressed an attitude quite the opposite of the preference for domestic law that
is evident in the majority opinions in Schlunk and Arospatiale, as well as in the
recent work of the rulemakers.2° Foreign litigants have not, however, reaped
many benefits, because rules originally formulated for their benefit have been
extended to domestic litigation,2 5 or because such rules are not worthy of the
name.2°6 Moreover, it is possible that "the Court's schizophrenic approach to
treaties is simply a function of calculations about when it is in the judiciary's
interest to share power.'
20 7
D. Treatymaking
It may seem odd to put treaties last among the methods of lawmaking for
international civil litigation, at least in an article celebrating the one hundredth
anniversary of the Hague Conference on Private International Law. My reasons
for doing so derive from a conviction that the historical and institutional
contexts in which our limited experience has occurred are essential to
198. Burbank, supra note 72, at 1493.
199. See id. at 1493-94; Patricia Anne Kuhn, Comment, Soci~t6 Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale:
The Supreme Court's Misguided Approach to the Hague Evidence Convention, 69 B.U. L. REV. 1011,
1048 (1989).
200. See Socirt6 Nationale Industrielle Arrospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct. for the So. Dist. of
Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 536-37 (common law countries would not have agreed to Article 23 if Convention
were exclusive means of obtaining evidence abroad). But see id. at 563-64 (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (pointing out the limited scope of Article 23 reservations).
201. See id. at 537-38 (Article 27 permits contracting states to use more liberal methods). As
correctly observed by Justice Blackmun, however, "[tihe only logical interpretation of... Article [27]
is that a state receiving a discovery request may permit less restrictive procedures than those designated
in the Convention." Id. at 551 n.2 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
202. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987).
203. See A~rospatiale, 482 U.S. at 546.
204. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 639-40 n.21
(1985); MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972); Kuhn, supra note 199, at 1048-49.
205. See Burbank, supra note 72, at 1466-67.
206. See Agrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 554-56 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
207. Burbank, supra note 72, at 1497.
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understanding and evaluating that experience. In addition, the success of a
treaty, particularly in the area of private international law, may depend to a
great extent on the processes of domestic lawmaking in which it is given effect.
When the United States joined the Hague Conference in 1964, it took
essentially its first steps towards seeking general international agreements in the
field of private international law, including procedural law for cases with
international aspects. The United States's previous experience was largely with
unilateral lawmaking. Moreover, unilateralism is not only an apt description of
our procedural lawmaking history prior to 1964. It was also the preferred
normative stance of many Americans, whether out of the general belief that
foreign entanglements should be avoided or a more focused concern that, in
matters of private international law, the federal government lacked the power
to, or at least should not, preempt state lawmaking institutions.
28
The adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure marked an important
turning point in attitudes towards the proper relationship between federal and
state law in the area of procedure and also ultimately had an impact on the
movement to seek international cooperation.2" At the same time, the Federal
Rules have made such cooperation more difficult, in part because the
rulemakers and the federal courts cling to the rhetoric, if not the reality, of
uniform and trans-substantive procedure,210 and in part because the first
consequential treatment of international civil litigation in the Federal Rules
occurred just before we joined the Hague Conference.
The 1963 amendments to the Federal Rules211 and the 1964 amendments
to the Judicial Code 212 were double-edged. The legislative amendments in
particular were very generous to foreign litigants and tribunals in need of
judicial assistance in this country. The rules amendments provided a counter-
weight, furnishing great flexibility but also asserting power with no requirement
of deference to the laws or policies of foreign countries. The hope was
expressed that other countries would follow our enlightened example,21 3 and
208. See supra text accompanying notes 1-9.
We maintained an isolationist position in the field of private international law long after we
had abandoned this ostrich posture in the public law area. For example, as late as 1958 the
United States delegation to the United Nations Conference on International Commercial
Arbitration, because of the traditional concern regarding federal-state relations, was under
instructions not to participate actively in formulating a convention for the recognition of
foreign arbitral awards. After the conference adopted- such a convention, the delegation
recommended against our adherence thereto on the ground, among others, that the United
States lacked a sufficient domestic legal basis for acceptance of an advanced international
convention on the subject of arbitration. This always struck me as making us out even more
backward than we were.
Kearney, supra note 154, at 2 (footnote omitted). For a description of consular agreements, diplomatic
notes, and treaties dealing with specialized aspects of judicial assistance, see First Annual Report, supra
note 44, at 8-9.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9; Jones, supra note 6, at 561-62.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 189-207. For the gap between the rhetoric and the reality,
see Burbank, supra note 76, at 1929-41.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 78-98.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 35-73.
213. See supra text accompanying note 66.
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a prominent rulemaker, although regretting this country's lack of initiative in the
international arena, saw no necessary adverse effect of the 1963 amendments on
international cooperation. It is time to assess the history of our attempts
to cooperate.
1. The Hague Service Convention. The members of the first official U.S.
delegation to the Hague Conference215 returned with what they hoped would
be the first multilateral convention on private international law to which the
United States was a party, the Service Convention. In describing that treaty to
the Senate, they stressed how little the United States, and how much other
countries, would have to give up.2" They also praised Congress's farsighted-
ness in unilaterally liberalizing our arrangements for judicial assistance,2 7
claiming that the recently enacted legislation had a dramatic impact on the
drafting process and, hence, on the final treaty.
21 8
It is hard to take seriously an imputation of farsightedness to Congress in
connection with the 1964 amendments to the Judicial Code.219 Moreover,
assertions that our unilateral act of generosity had been influential in shaping
the Service Convention appear to have been designed to persuade senators that
international procedure was an area in which we could exercise leadership
without surrendering anything of importance. In any event, we did not lead the
effort that resulted in the Service Convention; we followed and almost missed
the boat.
The United States joined the Hague Conference only after preparatory work
on the treaty had been completed. Our representatives did not participate in
the work of the Special Commission that produced the first draft.220 Our
government's observations on that draft and accompanying report were hardly
earthshaking; they were chiefly designed to clarify perceived ambiguities.22
More to the point, a comparison of the Special Commission's draft 222 with the
214. See supra text accompanying notes 93-95.
215. The United States had sent observer delegations to the Eighth and Ninth Sessions of the
Conference, in 1956 and 1960. See Nadelmann, Hague Conference, supra note 48, at 297-304.
216. See 1967 SENATE DOCUMENT, supra note 154, at 20 (Report of the U.S. Delegation); 1967
SENATE REPORT, supra note 154, at 7 (statement of Richard D. Kearney); id. at 9 (statement of Joe
C. Barrett); id. at 11 (statement of Philip W. Amram); see also 1967 SENATE DOCUMENT, supra note
154, at 8 (letter of submittal) ("The most significant aspect of the convention is the fact that it requires
so little change in the present procedures in the United States, yet at the same time requires such major
changes, in the direction of modern.and efficient procedures, in the present practices of many other
states."); id. at 1 (letter of transmittal).
217. "It is, I think, a handsome compliment to the Congress of the United States and to the
farsightedness of Public Law 88-619 that every basic change in procedure which the convention may
require is a change in the direction of our procedure." 1967 SENATE REPORT, supra note 154, at 11
(statement of Philip W. Amram).
218. See 1967 SENATE DOCUMENT, supra note 154, at 20 (Report of the U.S. Delegation)
("profoundly affected the ultimate text of the convention"); 1967 SENATE REPORT, supra note 154, at
6 (statement of Richard D. Kearney); id. at 11 (statement of Philip W. Amram) ("profound effect").
219. See supra text accompanying notes 67-68.
220. See Kearney, supra note 154, at 1-4.
221. See ACrES ET DOCUMENTS, supra note 153, at 127-29.
222. Id. at 112-16.
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final treaty' belies the notion that our unilateral efforts "profoundly affected
the ultimate text of the convention. '" 224
The major innovations of the Service Convention were the creation of the
Central Authority mechanism (coupled with the obligation of a designated
Central Authority to effect service) and the restriction of judgments entered
without notice. Both were features of the Special Commission's draft,225 as
they are of the final treaty.226 So too were the obligation of a Central
Authority to serve in a special manner requested by the applicant227 and
provisions for optional channels of service.228 Of course, there were changes
made in the Special Commission's draft, but the basic structure and most
important features of the treaty were in place before the United States entered
the game.229 Recalling the representations made to the Senate, it appears that
the major concession that our negotiators obtained was the continued unilateral
ability to provide more generous assistance to foreign litigants and tribunals
than the treaty required.23 ° One thing we gave up, although it is not easy to
223. Id. at 345-55.
224. 1967 SENATE DOCUMENT, supra note 154, at 20 (Report of the U.S. Delegation).
225. See AcTES ET DOCUMENTS, supra note 153, at 112-13 (Draft Articles 2, 4-6); id. at 114-15
(Draft Articles 13-16).
226. See id. at 345-47 (Articles 2, 4-6); id. at 349-50 (Articles 15-16).
227. Compare id. at 113 (Draft Article 6) with id. at 346 (Article 5). But see 1967 SENATE
DOCUMENT, supra note 154, at 20 (Report of the U.S. Delegation) ("In order to be sure that U.S.
requirements of due process are met ... article 5 of the convention permits the issuing authority to
request service in a particular manner... and requires the state addressed to follow that manner unless
it is incompatible with its internal law.").
228. Compare ACTES ET DOCUMENTS, supra note 153, at 114 (Draft Article 10) with id. at 348
(Article 10).
229. Mr. Kearney's subsequent description appears more accurate than the representations made to
the Senate.
Public Law 88-619 was, however, in a number of respects more liberal in providing judicial
assistance than the draft convention, which put the U.S. delegation in the pleasant position of
being able to accept the proposed procedure and to concentrate on eliminating restrictions on
its use. These efforts were reasonably successful ....
Kearney, supra note 154, at 4. He went on to mention two particular features of the Convention, the
"freedom of using channels of transmission other than the Central Authority," id. at 4, and "certain
substantive provisions having a due process character," id. at 5, that were part of the Special
Commission Draft. But see infra text accompanying note 230 (Article 19).
Even Mr. Amram admitted, with respect to "the due process provisions of articles 15 and 16," that
"the United States did not suggest their inclusion." 1967 SENATE REPORT, supra note 154, at 14.
230. The letter of submittal indicated that
Article 19, inserted at the request of the U.S. delegation, will preserve the full scope of Public
Law 88-619. It provides:
To the extent that the internal law of a contracting State permits methods of
transmission, other than those provided for in the preceding articles, of documents
coming from abroad, for service within its territory, the present Convention shall not
affect such provisions.
This article makes certain that there will be no change internally in the United States in the
philosophy, policy, and procedures of Public Law 88-619 and that even though other countries
may not offer as much as we do unilaterally, nothing now authorized by this act will be
repealed or reduced in the event of ratification of the convention on the part of the United
States.
1967 SENATE DOCUMENT, supra note 154, at 5 (letter of submittal). See 1967 SENATE REPORT, supra
note 154, at 2.
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discover from reading the legislative history of the treaty's ratification, was some
of the unilateral power asserted in, and in connection with, Federal Rule
4(i).231
The politics of advice and consent, or simply the egos of those involved, may
explain the puffing (and its opposite) that occurred in communications to the
Senate about the Service Convention. The primary U.S. negotiator had special
reason to want to claim such influence on the Service Convention because, if
true, it would vindicate the course taken by the Commission on International
Rules of Judicial Procedure on the advice of the Advisory Committee that he
chaired. 2
More than twenty years have passed since the United States ratified the
Service Convention, and we are just now seeking to clear up part of the mess
that has been spawned in domestic litigation by ignorance of the treaty and
uncertainty as to whether and when it is binding. 3  Some of our treaty
partners view with concern the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Service
Convention in the Schlunk case,' perhaps for the wrong reason. What
should most concern our treaty partners is the apparent unwillingness of the
Court in Schlunk to resort to the policies of the treaty, as it would a federal
statute, to strike down inconsistent state (or federal) law. 235 That bodes ill for
the Court's willingness to invalidate the waiver of service mechanism in
amended Rule 4(d) as applied to a foreign defendant. More important, the
amendment itself bodes ill for our effective participation in international
lawmaking. We had trouble admitting at the time that we conceded anything
in the Service Convention." Now we may appear to be trying to eliminate
those concessions unilaterally.
23 7
2. The Hague Evidence Convention. The United States was playing catch-up
at the session of the Hague Conference that adopted the Service Convention,
not only because the foundation for that treaty had already been laid without
its participation, but also because the whole experience of participating officially
in such an endeavor was new. Four years later, when the Conference adopted
the Evidence Convention, we could legitimately claim that the initiative had
been ours and, indeed, that we had taken the lead in drafting. 38 Moreover,
231. Although the letter of submittal states that "the provisions of the convention are in conformity
with rule 4(i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the service of process abroad," 1967
SENATE DOCUMENT, supra note 154, at 3; see id. at 7, elsewhere it notes that "articles 8 and 10 permit
a contracting state to narrow the group of permissible channels other than the central authority." Id.
at 5.
232. See 1967 SENATE REPORT, supra note 154, at 10 (statement of Philip W. Amram).
233. See supra text accompanying notes 99, 129-33. Amendments to the Federal Rules will not help
matters in the states except to the extent they use those rules as a model.
234. See Hague Conference on Private International Law: Special Commission Report on the
Operation of the Hague Service Convention and the Hague Evidence Convention, 28 I.L.M. 1556, 1560-61
(1989) [hereinafter 1989 Report]; Pfund, supra note 1, at 176.
235. See Burbank, supra note 72, at 1478-80.
236. See supra text accompanying note 231.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 122-24.
238. See Kearney, supra note 154, at 8-10.
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in aid of the international process, we had firmly in place a domestic process for
the provision of expert advice and political soundings to the State Department.
The Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Private International Law was
established in 1964.239 Both the Advisory Committee and a study group of
experts were involved in the preparatory work leading up to the Eleventh
Session of the Hague Conference, at which the Evidence Convention was
adopted.24 In addition, our representative was rapporteur of the Conference's
Special Commission on the Evidence Convention and of the Committee that
considered the Special Commission's draft at the Eleventh Session.241 In
retrospect, ours was not enlightened leadership.
The Evidence Convention has been a disappointment to many countries that
ratified it and a source of controversy and friction. Intended, as was the Service
Convention, to bridge gaps between the civil law and common law systems, the
treaty has proved inadequate. A major problem concerns pretrial discovery, in
which gaps exist even among common law systems. Some of the signatory states
believe that the Evidence Convention is the exclusive means to seek evidence
abroad, including through discovery.242  They were alarmed when, in
Agrospatiale, the Supreme Court held that it is not exclusive and, therefore,
does not prevent discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 243 A
prominent observer contends, on the other hand, that the Evidence Convention
was not intended to apply to pretrial discovery at all.2" What accounts for
such fundamental misunderstanding and disagreement?
For the United States, whatever the legal relevance of preratification
congressional materials in treaty interpretation, 245 a holding of exclusivity in
Agrospatiale would have come as a shock. In seeking the Senate's advice and
consent, proponents of the Evidence Convention stressed how little the United
States would concede and how much other countries would have to change their
239. See id. at 1; Pfund, supra note 1, at 168.
240. See Kearney, supra note 154, at 8-9.
241. See Report of United States Delegation to Eleventh Session of Hague Conference on Private
International Law, 8 I.L.M. 785, 805 (1969).
242. See 1989 Report, supra note 234, at 1565-64, 1569.
243. See Socidt6 Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale v. United States Dist. Court for the So. Dist.
of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522 (1987); supra text accompanying notes 197-207. The reaction was not limited to
signatory states:
At the Special Commission meeting, a distinguished delegate from an important country was
quite vigorous in assailing the Arospatiale decision, because he felt it had seriously damaged,
as a political matter, the prospects of his country adopting the Evidence Convention ....
[A]fter Arospatiale, leading politicians in his country, who had also supported the adoption
of the Convention, have tended to view that decision as a message that the U.S. does not take
its treaty obligations seriously.
Letter from Edwin R. Alley, Esq., to Hon. Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure, 2 (April 11, 1990) (copy on file with author).
244. See Lawrence Collins, The Hague Evidence Convention and Discovery: A Serious Misunder-
standing?, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 765, 783 (1986).
245. See, e.g., Malvina Halberstam, The Use of Legislative History in Treaty Interpretation: The Dual
Treaty Approach, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1645 (1991).
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ways.2' The presentations followed the script, sometimes literally, that had
been used successfully to sell the Service Convention.247  But although in
context most of the representations relevant to the exclusivity question
concerned, as does Article 27,24 only the freedom to provide more generous
assistance to others than the Convention requires, 249 some of the rhetoric is
difficult to cabin in that fashion. Thus, both the Senate and the U.S. bar were
told that the Evidence Convention "requires no major changes in United States
legislation or rules.' ' 0,
Whatever their intended scope, such representations were not likely to
induce belief in the exclusivity of the Evidence Convention. Yet, in light of the
unilateral steps that the United States had taken in 1964, after Agrospatiale
other countries must wonder what benefit they derived from us in the
treaty.2  A number of Special Commissions have considered practice and
problems under the Evidence Convention since it came into force.252 At the
first such meeting, there was apparently a consensus that the treaty suffers from
bad draftsmanship. 3 That is not the whole story.
The misunderstandings and disagreements that have marked interpretations
of, and practice under, the Evidence Convention are attributable to inadequate
education as much as to bad draftsmanship. It is a commonplace belief 2 4 that
treatymaking on matters of private international law, like judicial reform, "is no
246. See S. EXEC. Doc. A, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. iii (1972) (letter of transmittal) [hereinafter 1972
SENATE DOCUMENT]; id. at xi (letter of submittal); S. EXEC. REP. NO. 92-25, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5
(1972) [hereinafter 1972 SENATE REPORT].
247. Compare 1967 SENATE DOCUMENT, supra note 154, at 1 (letter of transmittal) and 8 (letter of
submittal) with 1972 SENATE DOCUMENT, supra note 246, at iii (letter of transmittal) and xi (letter of
submittal).
248. Article 27 provides:
The provisions of the present Convention shall not prevent a Contracting State from-
(a) declaring that Letters of Request may be transmitted to its judicial
authorities through channels other than those provided for in Article 2;
(b) permitting, by internal law or practice, any act provided for in this
Convention to be performed upon less restrictive conditions;
(c) permitting, by internal law or practice, methods of taking evidence other
than those provided for in this Convention.
23 U.S.T. at 2569, 847 U.N.T.S. at 246.
249. See 1972 SENATE DOCUMENT, supra note 246, at vi, x (letter of submittal); id. at 11, 13, 19-20,
22, 39 (Explanatory Report); 1972 SENATE REPORT, supra note 246, at 2.
250. 1972 SENATE REPORT, supra note 246, at 5 (quoting Philip Amram's argument to the ABA's
House of Delegates). But see Kuhn, supra note 199, at 1041 ("Amram's statement applies only to
changes in United States laws on judicial assistance to foreign litigants seeking evidence in the United
States.").
251. Although the Evidence Convention is a multilateral convention, this perspective may
nevertheless be reasonable given the amount of international civil litigation in the United States and
our initiative in proposing the Evidence Convention. See Kuhn, supra note 199, at 1039-40.
252. See 1989 Report, supra note 234. For earlier reports, see 17 I.L.M. 1417 (1978); 24 I.L.M. 1668
(1985).
253. See Report of the United States Delegation to the Special Commission on the Operation of the
Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 17
I.L.M. 1417, 1428 (1978).
254. See Pfund, supra note 1, at 170; Kearney, supra note 154, at 3.
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sport for the short-winded." 5  But the Evidence Convention was a sprint.
Flush with the supposed success of the Service Convention, the United States
proposed a treaty on taking evidence abroad in 1967. The treaty was adopted
in October 1968."5 The intervening time was insufficient for the process of
mutual education necessary for informed cooperation.257 In particular, it was
insufficient time to educate representatives of other countries about our unique
system of pretrial discovery and to reach accord about the effect the proposed
treaty would have on it. Indeed, misunderstanding on that score has continued
long after the treaty entered into force.5
There may have been sufficient legal reasons for the Supreme Court to hold
that the Evidence Convention is not exclusive, 9 but neither Article 27 nor
the desire to preserve the integrity of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was
one of them.26" Moreover, although the Court's expressed disbelief that our
treatymakers would have surrendered unilateral power261 is understandable in
context, it has not helped international cooperation. Reasoning of that sort can
be infectious, furnishing a spurious interpretive prop to others engaged in
domestic lawmaking 262 and making it appear to other countries that the
United States will play the game only if it never loses.
The Special Commissions of the Hague Conference that have considered
experience under the Service and Evidence Conventions have done more than
expose continuing misunderstanding. They have demonstrated that fruitful
dialogue is possible.263 It is a pity, therefore, that during the recent effort to
amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the rulemakers refused to heed
suggestions, including one from the executive branch, that we take up
255. ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION xix (Arthur
T. Vanderbilt ed., 1949). But see Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court,
Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693,717 (1988) ("[B]ut often the quip more
accurately describes the time it takes to sell a proposed reform than the time invested in conceiving
it.").
256. Kearney, supra note 154, at 8-9. "The speed of this operation is unprecedented in the private
law field." Id. at 9.
257. "The actual negotiation of treaties must be preceded by a campaign of reciprocal education by
our bar and those of the civil law countries." Jones, supra note 6, at 560. See also Jones, supra note
37, at 96-97.
[Varying perspectives] may even remain unconscious, and creep out of the dark quite
unexpectedly after the treaty is born. Differences of view ... on (existing) United States civil
proceedings for discovery abroad only appeared after this treaty had been in force for several
years; one will find little or nothing in the treaty's history pointing to any awareness of these
differences in perspective.
J.H.A. van Loon, The Hague Conventions on Private International Law, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES
IN DOMESTIC LAW 221, 225 (Francis G. Jacobs & Shelley Roberts eds., 1987).
258. See Pfund, supra note 1, at 174; 1989 Report, supra note 234, at 1565-64.
259. See Socirt6 Nationale Industrielle Arrospatiale v. United States Dist. Court for the So. Dist.
of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 534-35 & n.15 (1987). But see Kuhn, supra note 199, at 1036-41 (presenting five
arguments against the Court's conclusion of nonexclusivity).
260. See supra text accompanying notes 196-201.
261. See Agrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 536-37; supra text accompanying note 200.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 140-41, 195.
263. See van Loon, supra note 257, at 243; Georges A.L. Droz & Adair Dyer, The Hague Conference
and the Main Issues of Private International Law for the Eighties, 3 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUs. 155, 166-67
(1981).
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controversial interpretive positions that underlie domestic reform proposals at
the Hague Conference rather than unilaterally impose them.2"
III
COMMON APPROACHES AND ATTITUDES: UNILATERALISM, NATIONAL
UNIFORMITY, IMPATIENCE, AND PENURIOUSNESS
A. Unilateralism and National Uniformity
For most of our history, federal lawmakers have not provided for the special
needs and characteristics of procedure in international civil litigation, either
unilaterally or through international agreements. Federal legislation as to
matters of procedure in general has been episodic.265 The authors of the
original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure made only minor provisions for
international civil litigation,2" and the federal courts have usually conflated
international with domestic litigation in fashioning judge-made procedural
law.267 Finally, until 1964, the United States declined to become involved in
international efforts to address conflicts in procedural law.2"
One major factor that helps explain the historic dearth of congressional
legislation and absence of treaties on procedure for international civil litigation
is concern for the lawmaking prerogatives of the states. To the extent that
either the Constitution or domestic politics was thought to prevent federal
action, the necessary result was that, from an international perspective, the
United States acted (if at all) unilaterally, even if not with one voice.269
Concerns about the lawmaking prerogatives of the states have not been the
only cause of unilateralism in procedural lawmaking for international civil
litigation, however. Ours is a history of isolationism and of strong preference
for domestic solutions.27 ° The Federal Rules represented a triumph over
claims of federalism for the procedural law applied in the federal courts. But
the animating goal of uniformity, as implemented by the rulemakers and by the
federal courts in judge-made law, militated against special rules for international
civil litigation. The centrifugal force of a norm of national uniformity and of
legal chauvinism also rendered the pursuit of international uniformity more
difficult.271
In the relatively brief span of years since Congress created the Commission
and Advisory Committee on International Rules of Judicial Procedure, a
264. See, e.g., Executive Branch Comments, supra note 106, at 3-4. Moreover, the rulemakers
proceeded with the amendment to Rule 4 extending the waiver of service mechanism to international
civil litigation before the State Department had the opportunity to conduct a survey of foreign
government views. See supra text accompanying note 128.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 16-34.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 74-77.
267. See supra text accompanying notes 180-207.
268. See supra text accompanying note 1.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 7-9.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 5-6.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 74-77, 180-87.
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dramatic change has occurred in the United States's formal posture towards
procedural lawmaking for international civil litigation. There is, however, less
there than meets the eye. The Commission's recommendations of unilateral
changes in the U.S. rules regarding judicial assistance in 1963 and 1964 were
initially a consequence of its own vicissitudes and ultimately reflected the naive
view that if the United States were generous, other countries would follow its
lead.272 Moreover, that approach was in tension if not conflict with the
position already taken by Congress when it established the Commission and set
its priorities.27 3 Finally, grants of unilateral assistance were matched with
claims of unilateral power.274 The United States announced at the time that
no strings were attached to its generosity.275 Subsequent events suggest that
there is more than one way to attach strings and, more generally, that
unilateralism is a hard habit to break.276
There was little U.S. negotiators could do to affect the structure and major
features of the Service Convention, but that did not prevent them from making
extravagant claims in seeking Senate consent to the treaty. Their major
accomplishment seems to have been the preservation of freedom for countries
to offer more generous judicial assistance than required by the Convention.277
That was also a goal in drafting and negotiating the Evidence Convention. The
claims made in selling that treaty were similar in tone and content.27 8 The
domestic message on both occasions seemed to be that the United States can
272. See supra text accompanying notes 48-61, 80-82; Fourth Annual Report, supra note 58, at 9, 11;
Harry L. Jones, Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure, 8 AM. J. COMP. L. 341, 344
(1959). But see Philip W. Amram, Public Law No. 88-619 of October 3, 1964-New Developments in
International Judicial Assistance in the United States of America, 32 J. BAR ASS'N OF D.C. 24, 25, 33
(1965) (suggesting that initial decision to concentrate on unilateral reforms not driven by timing and
funding concerns).
In seeking more money for the Commission in 1965, Senator Morse observed:
As valuable as these revisions of our rules and statutes are, they do little to improve the
judicial assistance available to litigants in courts of the United States and in our State courts.
That can only be achieved by the negotiation of the procedural treaties which the Congress
has directed the Commission to draft.
111 CONG. REC. 8532 (1965).
273. See 103 CONG. REC. 5727 (1957) ("Effective and uniform reform of international procedures
can be brought about only by general international agreement."); supra text accompanying notes 39,
49, 61; supra note 95. But see Fourth Annual Report, supra note 58, at 11 ("The Commission has not
neglected this statutory responsibility . . . . [T~he drafting of international agreements should be
deferred for the time being until the results of possible unilateral action can be determined.").
274. See supra text accompanying notes 72, 92.
275. See supra text accompanying note 66.
276. As one commentator has noted, for example:
In Soci~t6 Nationale, the Court cited lack of reciprocity, but this country waived that objection
in 1964 when changes in legislation and the Federal Rules opened the way for foreign litigants
to secure evidence in this country freely. As Mr. Amram remarked, that step was taken
without any requirement of reciprocity. We should not now be returning to that narrow
approach.
Joseph F. Weis, Jr., The Federal Rules and the Hague Conventions: Concerns of Conformity and Comity,
50 U. PiTr. L. REV. 903, 932 (1989) (footnotes omitted). Cf. Bomstein & Levitt, supra note 68, at 451
([C]onsideration of reciprocity under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 "seems to be inconsistent with the purpose of
the statute ....").
277. See supra text accompanying notes 215-36.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 238-63.
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participate in the international arena without giving up the power to act
unilaterally whether in aid of litigation at home or abroad.
That is also a message treaty partners of the United States might reasonably
take from Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Service and Evidence
Conventions. Even if the Court reached the correct treaty interpretations in
Schlunk and Agrospatiale, it employed reasoning that could deny to treaties
regulating procedure in international civil litigation the power to constrain
unilateral action.279 Thus, in Schlunk the Court said that it was unwilling to
believe that "this country, or any other country, will draft its internal laws
deliberately so as to circumvent the- Convention."2'8  'In Arospatiale, the
Court manifested more interest in preserving the policies of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure than it did in adjusting domestic law to the policies of a
treaty.
281
The recent effort to amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with
respect to the needs of international civil litigation is more of the same. The
amendments to Rule 4 are said to be animated in part by a desire to give more
prominence to, and foster compliance with, the Service Convention and other
international agreements regulating service.' Although they would thus
mark an advance, in taking one step forward we are also taking two steps back.
Coming so soon after Schlunk, the extension of the waiver of service
mechanism abroad may be viewed by other signatories of the Service
Convention as a response to an invitation, rather than as proof that the Court
was a poor prophet, regarding the use of internal law to circumvent treaties.
28 3
In any event, the effect of the amendment will be to recapture unilaterally some
of the power that we surrendered in the Service Convention,28' all in the name
of national uniformity (in the federal courts). In the case of amended Rule 4
(f)(3) (providing for alternate methods of service upon order of the court), the
trade-offs are less obvious, due in large part to the drafting history. The
mischief now reposes in the Advisory Committee Note, which advances
interpretations of the Service Convention that call into question the genuineness
of a professed commitment not to violate treaties.
285
The proposed amendment to Rule 26 is gone, but it may not be soon
forgotten. Originally an attempt to adjust domestic law to the policies of the
Evidence Convention, the proposal quickly became mired in controversy. It
emerged from the first round barely comprehensible, and although eventually
279. See supra text accompanying notes 196-99; see also United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.
Ct. 2188, 2198 n.4 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("It is difficult to see how an interpretation that
encourages unilateral action could foster cooperation and mutual assistance-the stated goals of the
Treaty.").
280. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 705 (1988). See supra text
accompanying note 237.
281. See Socidtd Nationale Industrielle Mrospatiale v. United States Dist. Court for the So. Dist.
of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 542-43 (1987); Burbank, supra note 72, at 1493-94.
282. See 1993 Amendments, supra note 118, 113 S. Ct. at 632; supra text accompanying note 133.
283. See supra text accompanying notes 119-24.
284. See supra text accompanying notes 234-37.
285. See supra text accompanying notes 143-69.
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clarified in the second, might have been thought to claim more unilateral power
than it foreswore.2 6
In sum, unilateral lawmaking was the only course open to the United States
until it overcame the federalism and other objections to international coopera-
tion. By that time, however, ingrained chauvinism was buoyed at the federal
level by a normative preference for uniform rules. The rhetoric attending the
United States's first forays into the world of international procedural lawmaking
suggested that it could participate at no, or very little, cost to the established
regime. That has been the tendency of U.S. procedural lawmaking, internation-
al and domestic, ever since.
Whether or not unilateralism was initially a principled choice of the
Commission and Advisory Committee on International Rules of Civil Proce-
dure,' it was the preference of Professor Smit, who became an important
contributor to the Commission's work.' Indeed, it remains his preference
today.29 That preference is consistent with this country's traditional approach
to international relations but is hard to justify, even in purely practical terms,
in a world that is increasingly interdependent and in which our economic
strength is waning.
Unilateral lawmaking can, of course, lead to international rapprochement,
if not international cooperation, as the history of aggressive assertions of
legislative jurisdiction to enforce U.S. antitrust law may suggest. 2' But if
unilateral claims of power are to lead to international accord, they require both
the strength to persevere in the face of international objections and an eventual
perception on the part of other countries that it is in their best interests to
follow suit. Although the first condition may obtain in connection with
procedural law for international civil litigation, the second seems remote. Most
other countries do not share our views about litigation,291 and as we ourselves
reconsider those views, 2 2 they have even less incentive to emulate us.
Moreover, unilateralism can work in two directions, conferring as well as
seeking to appropriate benefits. The problem with unilateral generosity is that
it may weaken U.S. bargaining power when, other countries having chosen not
to follow our example, it attempts to work out mutually acceptable agree-
286. See supra text accompanying notes 170-79.
287. See supra text accompanying notes 48-61, 80-82, 272.
288. See Smit, supra note 72, at 1015-16, 1018-19, 1046; see also Amram, supra note 272.
289. See Hans Smit, International Control of International Litigation: Who Benefits?, 57 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 25 (Summer 1994) [hereinafter International Control]; Hans Smit, Les Conflits de
Juridiction en Procedure Civile, 1990 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPAR, No. 3, 872
[hereinafter Les Conflits].
290. See Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 L. & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 1, 67-68 (1992); Friedrich K. Juenger, Constitutional Control of Extraterritoriality?: A Comment
on Professor Brilmayer's Appraisal, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 39, 46 (Summer 1987).
291. See Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth, A Comparative Conclusion, in 16 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 6-436 (Mauro Cappelletti ed., 1984).
292. See Burbank, supra note 76, passim.
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ments.293 That looms as a difficulty for the United States in pursuing a
multilateral convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments.
294
Renouncing adherence to the Service and Evidence Conventions, which
Professor Smit advocates, 295 would at least be a straightforward way of
implementing a strategy of unilateralism. For that reason alone, it would be
preferable to 'the rulemakers' present course,29 a course encouraged by
Supreme Court decisions that are instinct with a preference for domestic law
and, in the case of federal courts, for national over international uniformity.2 7
Renunciation would also be preferable because it would require decisions by
those charged with the responsibility to conduct this country's foreign relations.
Because courts and rulemakers have neither mandate nor expertise in that
sphere, unilateral judicial lawmaking on matters that obviously and necessarily
implicate foreign relations is subject to criticism, whether it would confer or
seek to appropriate benefits.
298
Far from renouncing the Service and Evidence Conventions, however, we
should work harder with our treaty partners to understand and remove sources
of difficulties. That will require a greater commitment of time and resources
than we have thus far been willing to devote to the enterprise, and it will also
require greater willingness to entertain the notion that the U.S. way is not the
only rational way to proceed. 2' Equally important, an effort to understand
and remove the sources of present difficulties under the Service and Evidence
Conventions will require greater institutional coordination among domestic
lawmakers.3" Such coordination is necessary both to prevent unilateral
lawmaking that would compromise international cooperation and to insure that
any attempts to reach new understandings-an endeavor that should be a high
priority in the case of the Evidence Convention 3°0-are fully informed.
B. Impatience
The Commission and Advisory Committee on International Rules of Judicial
Procedure wanted to accomplish something in the short time originally allotted
to their work, and that period was not sufficient to complete the task that
Congress set as the first priority: "draft[ing] for the assistance of the Secretary
of State international agreements to be negotiated by him."3 2 The Commis-
293. See Burbank, supra note 72, at 1480. But see Smit, International Control, supra note 289, at 34
("better to put domestic law in optimum shape before seeking to negotiate a treaty or treaties").
294. See supra text accompanying note 5.
295. See Smit, International Control, supra note 289, at 44-45; Smit, Les Conflits, supra note 289, at
880, 882, 883.
296. See supra text accompanying notes 99-179.
297. See supra text accompanying notes 197-201, 234-36, 259-62, 281-83.
298. See infra text accompanying notes 329-46.
299. See infra text accompanying notes 315-27, 362-67.
300. See infra text accompanying notes 356-61.
301. See Born, supra note 171, at 101-02.
302. Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-906, § 2, 72 Stat. 1743. See supra text accompanying note
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sion lost some freedom of action, even though more time and money became
available, but there was always hope that success in the first phase might prompt
greater public support for the second.3"3 Success required that the first phase
be implemented even over the complaints of those who "objected that a more
civilized and clearer way of handling the whole question would be by concluding
specific bilateral or other arrangements with ... foreign countries on the matter
of so-called 'judicial assistance.""'3 °
When the United States joined the Hague Conference in 1964, it had the
opportunity to test whether, in fact, our recent unilateral lawmaking would
"inhibit efforts to achieve international arrangements. '" 30 5  The Service
Convention was no test at all, because we came on the scene so late in its
development. Yet, in the domestic process of ratification, "success" was defined
according to the extent of unilateral power preserved.306 That attitude, the
attendant conviction that the United States's system alone is worth emulating,
and the short time devoted to drafting and negotiating the Evidence Conven-
tion, hindered mutual education and understanding.3 7 The 1964 legislation
may have brought "the United States to the forefront of nations adjusting their
procedures to those of sister nations, ''3' but the adjustments were unilateral.
Having given so much, we were not willing to take the time necessary to
understand other legal systems and legal cultures, or to educate representatives
thereof about our own.
The impatience of U.S. lawmakers thus had at least two aspects: a desire to
push ahead with reforms we deemed appropriate and an unwillingness to come
to grips with the underlying assumptions and animating policies of legal
arrangements in other countries. Subsequent events have confirmed that the
integrity of domestic law, in particular the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is
more important to the United States than accommodating the needs of the
international legal order. That was one of the messages of the Supreme Court's
decision in Arospatiale,3° and it seems to have been received loud and clear
by the lower federal courts,310 while the rest of the Court's opinion has been
relegated to the dustbin of U.S. rhetoric on international cooperation.31' It is
303. See supra text accompanying notes 52-53, 61, 80-84, 287-89.
304. Kaplan, supra note 75, at 636. Professor Smit asserts that "[a]t no time was consideration given
to drafting conventions in the areas addressed by the Project and the Commission." Smit, International
Control, supra note 289, at 33 n.48. The record does not support this assertion. See, e.g., supra notes
272-73 and accompanying text.
305. Kaplan, supra note 75, at 636. See supra text accompanying notes 95, 214.
306. See supra text accompanying notes 215-32.
307. See supra text accompanying notes 238-58.
308. S. REP. No. 1580, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1964). See supra text accompanying note 66.
309. See supra text accompanying notes 196-207, 281.
310. See Stephen F. Black, United States Transnational Discovery: The Rise and Fall of the Hague
Evidence Convention, 40 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 901, 906 (1991); Born, supra note 171, at 86-90.
311. See Bruce Zagaris, Developments i International Judicial Assistance and Related Matters, 18
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 339 (1990).
To be successful, diplomacy must have legitimacy. To establish legitimacy often requires time
and forceful marshalling of evidence and argument. To short cut the process and try to
impose realpolitik may be counterproductive. Treaties and international assistance remain
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also a message other countries, including the United States's treaty partners,
may take from the recent process to amend the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.312 The rulemakers are pursuing a vision of domestic justice at the
expense of international justice.
C. Penuriousness
The Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure's attempts to
secure adequate funding from Congress make for depressing reading. 313 The
work that the Commission accomplished resulted primarily from private funding,
and, perhaps in part for that reason, the Commission did not follow Congress's
stated priorities.
314
Once the United States determined to participate in efforts to reach
international agreements in the area of private international law by joining the
Hague Conference and other similar organizations, it remained to be seen
whether those commitments would be backed up with the resources necessary
for effective participation. The record is mixed. It has improved, but there is
still progress to be made.
The United States has financial obligations to the Hague Conference and
other similar international organizations to which it belongs. Unfortunately, the
politics of certain international organizations has in the past caused this country
to treat all such organizations monolithically, reducing or delaying our
payments.315 Private international law, including procedure, is not without a
political component, but it is far removed from the concerns that caused us to
cut back on funding." 6 The United States needs to be more discriminating in
the future, mindful that other members are likely to see in the failure to pay our
dues a lack of serious commitment to the enterprise.
The drafting and negotiating of treaties requires an infrastructure within
domestic institutions. For initiatives in private international law, the Depart-
ment of State relies on the Office of the Legal Adviser, the Secretary's Advisory
Committee on Private International Law, and ad hoc groups of experts. 7
This system, both in formulating the United States's positions and in seeking
areas in which developments in enforcement have the most potential because no large country
other than the U.S. has so few treaties and yet so much rhetoric about international
cooperation.
Id. at 384-85.
312. See supra text accompanying notes 123-28.
313. See, e.g., Hearings Before Subcommittees of the House Committee on Appropriations, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess., Part 1, at 201-23 (1965).
314. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49, 61.
315. See Harold S. Burman & Peter H. Pfund, Review of Developments from May 1990 to August
1991, at 15-16 (unpub. manuscript on file with author).
316. See id. But see Hearing on H.J. Res. 732 Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Organizations and
Movements of the House Committee on Foreign Relations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 53-54 (1963) [hereinafter
Hague Hearing] ("[E]very organization we belong to is not only a technical organization but a political
organization, and our delegates have to be prepared to carry on a political fight.").
317. See, e.g., Kearney, supra note 154, at 1, 8; Pfund, supra note 1, at 168.
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ratification of concluded treaties, places heavy reliance on the private sector.
That emphasis appears to reflect the views that, in matters of private law, the
government's role is to seek to implement the preferences of U.S. legal
consumers (including government consumers), and that success in securing the
consent of the Senate depends on the enthusiasm of, and lack of serious
disagreements among, those consumers. 319 Viewing the enterprise as driven
by the private sector permits, or at least helps to justify, heavy reliance on
private resources to fund the work.32
In the early years of U.S. involvement in the work of the Hague Conference
and other similar organizations, the responsibility for private international law
work rested with a designated individual within the State Department's Office
of the Legal Adviser.32' Since 1979, there has been a separate Office of the
Assistant Legal Adviser for Private International Law charged with those
responsibilities. That office now has two full-time professionals, an administra-
tive assistant, and occasional student interns. Their responsibilities are varied:
monitoring developments under the private international law treaties to which
the United States is a party; coordinating attempts to secure ratification of such
treaties signed on behalf of the United States; organizing and chairing study
groups to consider new treaty initiatives; and participating in international
meetings for the purpose of negotiating treaties and discussing experience under
treaties already concluded.322
Both the Secretary's Advisory Committee and its associated study groups are
composed primarily (although by no means exclusively) of lawyers and
academics from the private sector who participate without compensation and
often without reimbursement of expenses.3" Funds for meetings both at home
and abroad are limited, and it requires careful planning and creativity on the
part of the Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Private International Law,
as well as generosity on the part of private sector participants, to ensure that the
United States is adequately represented.324
It is no criticism of the Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Private
International Law to say that the public support provided for the work of that
office is inadequate. On the contrary, the volume and quality of the work
accomplished are extraordinary. But there are only twenty-four hours in a day,
and, as the United States increases its private international law commit-
ments, 325 the setting of priorities will become more painful and the costs of
318. See Hague Hearing, supra note 316, at 10; Peter H. Pfund, United States Participation in
International Unification of Private Law, 19 INT'L LAW. 505, 508-510, 517-19 (1985); Pfund, supra note
1, at 168, 180-81.
319. See Pfund, supra note 318, at 508, 518.
320. See Kearney, supra note 154, at 16; Pfund, supra note 318, at 509. Cf. Nadelmann, supra note
48, at 299, 302 (1956 and 1960 observer delegations to Hague Conference did not receive government
funds).
321. See Kearney, supra note 154.
322. Interview with Peter H. Pfund (August 26, 1992) [hereinafter August 1992 Pfund Interview].
323. Id. See Pfund, supra note 318, at 509.
324. August 1992 Pfund Interview, supra note 322.
325. See Pfund, supra note 1, at 178-80.
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tasks deferred or simply not addressed will become unacceptable. The problem
may not be unique to this office, which must compete for resources with other
elements of the State Department. The dollars required for one or two more
professionals in the office and for adequate participation in domestic and
international meetings are, however, a small price to pay when the stakes are
this country's effectiveness in an increasingly important field of international
lawmaking.
The United States has interests in private international law that transcend,
and may even conflict with, the collective preferences of U.S. legal consumers.
Federal and state governments devote substantial resources to the establishment
and maintenance of court systems. In addition, the resolution of international
disputes and the establishment of behavioral norms for international actors is
increasingly critical to our economic and social well-being as a nation. There
is no bright line between public and private law,326 a fact that both complicates
the work of reaching international agreements on matters of private internation-




The recent history of U.S. involvement in procedural lawmaking for
international civil litigation reveals pervasive tension between the desire to
honor international agreements and the determination to do justice as we see
it. In resolving that tension, we have too often preferred to act rather than
discuss, to act unilaterally rather than cooperatively, and to pursue national
rather than international uniformity. Professor Smit's proposal that we
renounce adherence to the Service and Evidence Conventions is at least
forthright.328 Sharing the view that the United States should conduct itself
forthrightly in the international arena, I believe that both normative and
practical considerations argue for more rather than less international coopera-
tion. If that is correct, there must be a greater commitment of time and
resources to the enterprise. More fundamentally, there must be some
adjustments in lawmaking structures and techniques.
A. Legislation and Court Rulemaking
The arguments traditionally made in support of the control of procedure by
court rules rather than legislation include institutional authority, expertise, and
efficiency.32 9 In recent years, federal court rulemaking has attracted consider-
326. See, e.g., Symposium, The Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982).
327. See Juenger, supra note 290, at 46; Pfund, supra note 318, at 507.
328. See supra text accompanying note 297.
329. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Regulation of Judicial Procedure by Rules of Court, 10 ILL. L. REV.
163 (1915); Owen J. Roberts, Trial Procedure-Past, Present and Future, 15 A.B.A. J. 667 (1929).
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able attention and generated substantial controversy.33° Congress's overhaul
of the Enabling Acts331 has not succeeded in quieting the criticism.332 In
large part, that is due to growing awareness of the political dimensions of
procedural reform,333 an awareness fueled by Congress's own forays into the
field.334 When proposed Federal Rules require choices between procedural
and substantive policies, including by reason of their anticipated effects, claims
for rulemaking founded in the judiciary's institutional authority and expertise
are of diminished force, as are claims for trans-substantive procedural law.
335
Moreover, changes in the rulemaking process, 336 assimilating it to the legisla-
tive process, have sapped claims of comparative efficiency, and Congress's
renascent interest in procedural reform has weakened the argument concerning
that body's traditional inertia.
International civil litigation in U.S. courts is sufficiently ubiquitous that, in
one sense, every proposed change in domestic procedure has international
implications. Very few such proposals, however, necessarily and obviously
implicate U.S. foreign relations. The biggest subset is likely to be proposals that
deal with matters that are the subject of international agreements. When
proposed procedural lawmaking necessarily and obviously implicates U.S.
foreign relations, there is no persuasive theoretical or practical argument for
court rulemaking in its present form.
Court rulemaking under the Enabling Act does not require or even
contemplate congressional approval, and it gives no role at all to the President
(except insofar as blocking proposed Federal Rules requires legislation).337
Moreover, such congressional review as has occurred both of specific proposals
and of the rulemaking process has usually been at the initiative of the House of
Representatives. 338  In other words, the enterprise is one in which the
institutions primarily charged with the conduct of this country's foreign relations
play either no role at all or a very minor (and reactive) role. For procedural
law of the sort under discussion-necessarily and obviously implicating U.S.
foreign relations-the perspective of institutional authority does not support the
current process of creating Federal Rules.
3 9
330. See, e.g., 1985 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 30, at 12-14; supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
331. Act of Nov. 19, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642, 4648-52; see supra text accompanying
notes 31-32.
332. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 72, at 1484-90, 1494-96.
333. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 34, at 849; Burbank, supra note 76, at 1934-41; Burbank, supra
note 255, at 713-19.
334. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
335. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Proposals To Amend Rule 68-Time to Abandon Ship, 19 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 425 (1986).
336. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (1988).
337. See id. §§ 2072, 2074. An exception in section 2074(b) requires that "[a]ny such rule creating,
abolishing, or modifying an evidentiary privilege shall have no force or effect unless approved by Act
of Congress."
338. See 1985 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 30, at 4-19.
339. Cf. David J. Gerber, Obscured Visions: Policy, Power, and Discretion in Transitional Discovery,
23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 993 (1991) (criticizing extensive judicial discretion in transnational
discovery). Many of Professor Gerber's arguments and much of his analysis are equally applicable to
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.Unlike the Commission and Advisory Committee on International Rules of
Judicial Procedure,' the judges (including Justices), academics, and (very
few) practicing lawyers who collectively comprise the group I refer to as "the
rulemakers" have little experience or expertise in international civil litigation,
let alone international law.341  The Advisory Committee's interpretations of
the Service Convention in connection with the 1993 amendments to Rule 4 and
the whole Rule 26 fiasco are not reassuring in that regard. 42 The Supreme
Court sent back proposals with foreign relations implications, and although
some of them became effective as revised, it was not a speedy process.
3 43
The rulemakers are bright, accomplished individuals who can learn what
they do not know. Unfortunately, the Advisory Committee made no special
effort to learn the views of experts in international relations and international
law, including representatives of the State Department, apparently relying on
a monolithic view of the government, and thus on the Justice Department, to
convey those views. 4 Moreover, when the State Department's views were
finally made known, they were for a time dismissed or discounted as reactive or
as a change of position. 34" Against this background, the last-minute efforts of
the Chairs of the Advisory and Standing Committees, which resulted in an
important change in the amendments to Rule 4, are even more impressive,
however irregular the procedure. 3 6
When prudence counsels (or the Enabling Act requires) that federal law be
made through legislation rather than court rules, the desire to take advantage
of the rulemakers' expertise, to facilitate comprehensive procedural reform, to
honor a sense of shared institutional authority, or to overcome traditional
congressional inertia, may nonetheless suggest the wisdom of a two-tier process.
service of process abroad. Moreover, many of the considerations he adduces for curbing judicial
discretion are equally apt when the question is not whether there should be rules but who should make
them and pursuant to what process. See id. at 1006-09.
340. See supra text accompanying note 98.
341. In making this assertion, I have reviewed biographical material on each member of the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and of the Standing Committee who was serving in June 1992
(biographical materials on file with author).
342. See supra text accompanying notes 148-79.
343. See supra text accompanying notes 99-103.
344. The State Department's Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Private International Law did
not initially receive a copy of the proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. "It
was rather disquieting and embarrassing that the U.K. government was somehow more aware of these
developments within the United States than was the State Department. The consequent need to catch
up has not been comfortable for any of the agencies and persons involved." Pfund, supra note 128, at
160. The Legal Adviser's Office was apparently in the same position. See letter from Franklin R. Bay,
Deputy Legal Adviser, to Joseph F. Spaniol, Jr., Secretary, Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure (February 14, 1992) (copy on file with author). In requesting copies of pending and future
proposed amendments "as a matter of routine," Mr. Bay observed:
Such notice would provide the Department the opportunity to help ensure that the effects of
proposed amendments on international treaty obligations of the United States, U.S. ability to
comply with the requirements of customary international law, and good international relations
of the United States with other countries may adequately be taken into account.
Id. at 2.
345. See supra text accompanying notes 134-36, 142.
346. See supra text accompanying notes 114-18.
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The weak version of such a process would require only that the rulemakers
bring questionable exercises of authority to Congress's attention. The
strong version would require legislation to implement the rulemakers'
recommendations on such matters.34 Both versions would leave the initiative
to formulate new or amended Federal Rules with the rulemakers.
Putting aside the rulemakers' lack of, and failure to seek out, international
expertise, the recent amendments to Rule 4 presented a situation in which the
strong version of a two-tier process, involving the active participation of the
rulemakers, Congress, and the President on those proposals having necessary
and obvious implications for foreign relations, would have been useful. The
amendments involved a comprehensive revision of Rule 4, and service of
process abroad was properly part of such an endeavor. The rulemakers'
expertise was important but, particularly because treaties could be affected, it
was not the only perspective needed. The Advisory Committee recognized that
a proposal to extend the federal courts' territorial authority to adjudicate in
federal question cases raised Enabling Act issues, and it flagged the matter for
the Supreme Court and Congress. 9 Given that the primary impact of that
provision will come in international civil litigation,350 it is a shame that the
Committee did not take a similar approach to other controversial provisions in
Rule 4 that necessarily and obviously implicate this country's foreign rela-
tions."1 Better yet, legislation should have been sought on all such proposals,
with the rest of the amendments to Rule 4 following the process prescribed by
the Enabling Act.35a
It is not just formal claims of institutional authority and expertise that
prompt resistance to a two-tier process. The myth of trans-substantive
procedure cannot accommodate rules that are differentiated on substantive or
other grounds. Undifferentiated procedure in turn serves to protect judicial
power by submerging policy choices and making it harder to identify issues for
347. This is exactly what the rulemakers have done in a "Special Note" to amended Rule 4, which
reads: "Special Note: Mindful of the constraints of the Rules Enabling Act, the Committee calls the
attention of the Supreme Court and Congress to new subdivision (k)(2). Should this limited extension
of service be disapproved, the Committee nevertheless recommends adoption of the balance of the
rule." 1993 Amendments, supra note 118, 113 S. Ct. at 631-32. For the history of this "Special Note"
and the proposal to which it relates, see Burbank, supra note 72, at 1484 n.164. The current text of the
provision is quoted supra note 143. See also infra text accompanying note 349.
348. See Burbank, supra note 8, at 1195 n.775.
349. See supra note 347.
350. See supra note 143.
351. In light of the history of the 1993 amendments to Rule 4, the Supreme Court was aware of the
potential problems. See supra text accompanying notes 99-101. Moreover, the Court presumably
sought to ensure such awareness in requesting a report about any proposals that were controversial.
See supra note 177. Congress may not have had the benefit of knowledge deriving from either the
history or the report.
352. Legislation should have been sought for the extension of personal jurisdiction in federal
question cases, see supra note 143, and the application of the waiver of service mechanism to
international cases. See supra text accompanying note 104. Amended Rule 4(f)(3), supra text
accompanying note 143, is not on its face controversial for these purposes. Rather, it is the Advisory
Committee Note that may cause problems.
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congressional attention.3 Those are reasons enough for Congress to require
a two-tier process of the strong type when the rulemakers propose Federal
Rules that necessarily intersect with an existing treaty. The existence of a treaty
is an admittedly imperfect surrogate for a substantial foreign relations interest.
But the requirement would at least ensure the active participation of Congress
and the President in unilateral domestic lawmaking on matters where we have
already made a national commitment to international cooperation. 4 It would
also provide an opportunity for Congress to consider whether a particular
proposal should apply in state courts, an option not available to the rulemak-
ers.
355
Even if the United States adopts a two-tier process of the strong type for
rulemaking proposals that necessarily and obviously implicate foreign
relations-and especially if we do not-the rulemakers need to put their house
in order. It makes no sense to have them proceed through all or most of their
deliberations in ignorance of foreign relations considerations (or foreign or
international law), leaving to Congress the task of redoing the policy calculus
after hearing and taking full account of those concerns.
Changes in the world and in the world of litigation may bring the concerns
of international civil litigation to the attention of the rulemakers more often in
the future than they have in the past, but they are likely to remain a sidelight.
Indeed, some of the problems that plagued the recent effort to amend the
Federal Rules may have been due to the heavy load of proposals on the
Advisory Committee's plate, many of which were controversial and all of which
vied for a finite amount of time for study, reflection, and discussion.356
The probable distribution of the rulemakers' workload in the future does not
justify a major effort to secure relevant international expertise among their
number, particularly since there are more pressing issues of representative-
ness.3 57  At the same time, however, revising the lists of those notified of
proposed Federal Rules will not ensure that such expertise is effectively
communicated and considered.
It will help in the future if the rulemakers understand that the executive
branch is not a monolith and that differences of opinion are possible within, as
well as between, agencies and departments. Such understanding might have
prevented members of the Advisory Committee from imputing a change of
353. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 255, at 715-19; Burbank, supra note 76, at 1934-41.
354. In ensuring such participation, it would render moot the very difficult question whether a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure can supersede a treaty. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)(1988); Burbank, supra
note 72, at 1488-90. Recently, a federal district court has even drawn in question the received wisdom
that a statute can supersede a treaty. See Gouveia v. Vokes, 800 F. Supp. 241 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
355. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988). In establishing the Commission and Advisory Committee on
International Rules of Judicial Procedure, Congress was equally concerned about improvements in state
and federal tribunals. See Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-906, § 2, 72 Stat. 1743, quoted supra text
accompanying note 39.
356. The 1993 amendments to the Civil Rules included controversial changes to Rule 11 and Rule
26. See Hughes, supra note 118, at 5-8, 10.
357. See Laura A. Kaster & Kenneth A. Wittenberg, Rulemakers Should Be Litigators, NAT'L L.J.,
Aug. 17, 1992, at 15.
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position or reactiveness to comments the timing of which was in part a function
of late notice to the State Department.35
Separate mailings to concerned departments and agencies can solve the
problem of late notice, but they cannot solve the problem the rulemakers face
when they confront, as they have recently, conflicting positions. One solution
to that problem is to reduce conflicts by requiring executive branch comments
on proposed Federal Rules to be coordinated and cleared in a manner similar
to comments on proposed legislation.3 59 But even if the process works for
legislation, it is doubtful that it should be extended to an arena in which no
ultimate legislative activity is contemplated and thus the risks of muting or
submerging one agency's or department's concerns may be unduly high.
Assuming that executive branch agencies and departments will remain free
to comment separately on proposed Federal Rules, it is not appropriate for the
rulemakers simply to discount criticism because it is not unanimous. It is
possible to evaluate comments according to the perspective from which they are
made. When, for example, a litigating agency comments on a proposal having
international implications, it is fair to assume that it does so with considerable
self-interest. The State Department lacks such direct self-interest, and it is
above all charged with responsibility for this country's foreign relations. The
comments of the State Department reflecting that responsibility deserve far
more weight from the rulemakers in the future than they have received in the
recent past.
For its part, the State Department should improve its method for formulat-
ing and communicating comments on proposed Federal Rules. It cannot safely
rely on another department, which may have inconsistent views.36° Moreover,
the Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Private International Law cannot
easily perform the task given its current workload. The Secretary's Advisory
Committee on Private International Law is not necessarily well-suited for such
a specialized mission.361 It could, however, create a standing study group for
the purpose of evaluating proposed Federal Rules and helping the Department
prepare comments.
The proposed study group could perform useful services in addition to
evaluating proposed Federal Rules. It could monitor experience under existing
treaties, federal legislation, Federal Rules, and state provisions that relate to
international civil litigation, as well as suggest reforms. In so doing, the group
would continue the work of the Commission and Advisory Committee on
International Rules of Judicial Procedure.
358. See supra text accompanying notes 142, 166-67, 344.
359. See Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-19 (rev. 1979).
360. See, e.g., Executive Branch Comments, supra note 106; Pfund, supra note 128, at 160-61.
361. See Nadelmann, supra note 48, at 322; Pfund, supra note 1, at 168.
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B. Treatymaking and Interpretation
The United States has come a long way since joining the Hague Conference
in 1964. A well-developed structure is in place for advising the State Depart-
ment on treaty proposals and for formulating and negotiating U.S. positions on
matters of private international law. The United States has emerged from a
period when there was concern that the failure to ratify treaties would imperil
its effective participation in international lawmaking.362 We are no longer in
a rush to conclude treaties, but neither are we paralyzed at the stage of national
commitment. More public resources should be devoted to the enterprise, but
the basic structure appears sound. Recent experience, however, suggests some
steps that may be helpful in the future.
I have argued that the major weakness of the Supreme Court's decisions
interpreting the Service and Evidence Conventions reposes not in the Court's
treaty interpretations narrowly viewed, but in language that exalts domestic law,
particularly the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and suggests an unwillingness
to subordinate or adjust such law to the requirements of a treaty.3 63 I have
also argued that, given the domestic ratification histories of those treaties, the
Court's posture is understandable but that it has had a baneful effect on
subsequent domestic lawmaking initiatives.3 " Moreover, I have attempted to
discriminate between unilateral domestic lawmaking that faithfully and
appropriately advances the policies of a treaty and lawmaking that either
subverts treaty policies or is an unjustifiable giveaway, both of which undermine
our international bargaining position.365
If, as I believe, the United States will be required to compromise more in
the future than it has (or has been willing to acknowledge) in the past when
concluding treaties on aspects of procedure in international civil litigation, it is
vitally important that the negotiators understand the compromises and fully and
accurately describe them in the ratification process.
Just as the federal rulemaking process should more systematically and
thoughtfully incorporate the views and perspectives of the State Department,
the State Department should insure that its processes, in particular for study
groups, require consultation with the rulemakers on matters proposed for
international agreement that are addressed in the Federal Rules.366 Moreover,
some similar mechanism should be in place to ensure understanding of the
ramifications of possible treaty provisions for state procedural law.
Assuming the negotiators understand the extent to which a treaty signed on
behalf of the United States derogates from domestic law, it should be easy for
362. See Pfund, supra note 1, at 178-81.
363. See supra text accompanying notes 196-207, 234-35, 259-62, 279-81, 309.
364. See supra text accompanying notes 279-86.
365. See supra text accompanying note 295; Burbank, supra note 72, at 1480.
366. Effective consultation will depend upon the group consulted and timing. It is not enough to
seek (or receive) blessing from the Judicial Conference after a treaty has been negotiated. See, e.g.,
1967 SENATE DOCUMENT, supra note 154, at 7.
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them accurately to describe those matters in the ratification process. There may
be reluctance to make full disclosure out of concern that it will generate
controversy, which according to traditional wisdom is the death of private
international law treaties. 367  Yet, such a strategy has potential costs in
addition to the obvious. Courts and other domestic lawmakers have good
reason to be reluctant to confer-unilaterally in their view-advantages that the
Senate had no reason to think it had conferred. Moreover, an emphasis on the
integrity of domestic law in treatymaking renders even modest compromises
vulnerable to subsequent unilateral domestic lawmaking. Both phenomena
weaken the standing of the United States in the international community.
If the cost of candor in the ratification process is the Senate's unwillingness
to give its advice and consent to private international law treaties, the United
States may need to rethink its approach to such treaties. Assuming that the
United States's interests are more than the sum of the collective preferences of
U.S. legal consumers, it should be willing to ratify a treaty, even in the face of
domestic opposition, if that treaty represents, on the whole, a net improvement.
V
CONCLUSION
It is ironic that, at a time when the premises of U.S. procedure are
undergoing reexamination and some of the basic rules are changing,3"
lawmakers should remain so attached to the integrity of domestic law and its
export abroad through international civil litigation. A good part of the
explanation lies in the fact of, and the attitudes that shaped, a long history of
unilateral lawmaking and the correspondingly short history of international
lawmaking in its shadow. Moreover, in the case of federal procedural law, since
1938 the integrity of domestic law has meant uniformity. Seeking to preserve
domestic procedural uniformity renders the quest for international uniformity
more difficult. Finally, even if isolationism is no longer a national trait,
impatience and chauvinism surely are, and will remain so if lawmakers ignore
foreign and international law.
If I am correct that we can no longer have our cake and eat it too,
institutional changes of the sort I have recommended will not be sufficient to
accommodate the new reality. Nor, for that matter, will a greater infusion of
time and money to international lawmaking. We must be more willing than we
have been to engage other legal systems seriously. Only by doing so will we be
able to redefine success in international lawmaking,369 and thereby become
members in fact, as well as in name, of the international legal community.
367. See, e.g., Pfund, supra note 1, at 180-81; Pfund, supra note 318, at 517-18.
368. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 76; supra text accompanying note 356.
369. See supra text accompanying note 306.
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VI
POSTSCRIPT
Shortly before this Symposium issue was to be published, Professor
Carrington and Judge Phillips wrote their article on "the interface of treaties
and rules of procedure., 37" That, of course, is a subject treated in some detail
in my article.371 In order not further to delay publication, I leave a detailed
comparison of our views to interested readers. I now wish to make only three
observations.
First, I am delighted that Professor Carrington and Judge Phillips agree with
me that procedural law necessarily implicating this country's foreign relations
should be made by Congress, not the Supreme Court exercising rulemaking
power under the Enabling Act.372 They thus agree with me that, at the least,
Congress should have been alerted to the potential ramifications of extending
the waiver of service mechanism in amended Rule 4 to those who must be
served abroad.373
Second, contrary to those authors' present recollection,374 the foreign
relations implications of the proposed amendments to Rule 4 were the subject
both of written comments and of testimony in 1990, 37' before foreign govern-
ments made their objections known and before the State Department was aware
370. J. Dickson Phillips & Paul D. Carrington, Reflections on the Interface of Treaties and Rules of
Procedure: Time for Federal "Long-Arm" Legislation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153 (Summer
1994).
371. See supra text accompanying notes 99-179, 189-207, 233-37, 263-64, 282-86, 295-98, 309-12, 329-
61.
372. Compare Phillips & Carrington, supra note 370, at 154 ("It seems to these authors that the place
to resolve any conflicts between the Executive's concerns in foreign relations and the courts' concern
for even-handed civil justice is in Congress."), with supra text accompanying note 339 ("For procedural
law of the sort under discussion-necessarily and obviously implicating U.S. foreign relations-the
perspective of institutional authority does not support the current process of creating Federal Rules."),
and supra text accompanying notes 347-48.
373. Compare Phillips & Carrington, supra note 370, at 154 ("We regret that [flagging 'any doubtful
matters for consideration by Congress'] was not the process followed with respect to the 1993 revision
of Rule 4"), and id. at 157-58, with supra text accompanying note 351 ("it is a shame that the
Committee did not take a similar approach to other controversial provisions in Rule 4 that necessarily
and obviously implicate this country's foreign relations").
374. See Phillips & Carrington, supra note 370, at 157 ("As best we recall, only one objection to the
proposed revision of Rule 4 was timely received.").
375. See sources cited supra notes 118, 124 and accompanying text; Burbank, supra note 72, at 1485-
89.
Although court rules relating to the manner of service do not normally present problems of
validity, there is reason to doubt whether the Supreme Court has the power to act as if it were
the Congress, and to bypass presidential assent, where service of process implicates the foreign
trade or foreign policy interests of the United States .... [N]ot only has this country entered
into two international service conventions since 1963, but events in the intervening years have
demonstrated the sensitivity of service on foreign nationals.
Letter from Stephen B. Burbank to Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 1-2 (Mar. 14, 1990)
(copy on file with author).
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of the proposal.376 In that regard, these recent rulemakers are true to form
in acting as if the executive branch were a monolith.377
Third, Professor Carrington and Judge Phillips regard the waiver of service
issue as a "tempest ... in a teapot ', 3 78 because of the Supreme Court's
decision in Schlunk.379 For me, the argument only confirms that Schlunk has
had a baneful effect on procedural lawmaking for international cases.
3 °
Indeed, taken together with the authors' proposal for a federal statute
generalizing the result in Schlunk,381 the argument suggests how far domestic
lawmakers may go in unilaterally cancelling the concessions made in a
treaty.
382
376. See supra note 344 and accompanying text.
377. Compare Phillips & Carrington, supra note 370, at 153 ("Foreign relations are in the first
instance the concern of the Executive Branch; it negotiates treaties. It also participates in court
rulemaking through its representation on the Judicial Conference committees."), and id. at 156 ("The
Executive Branch participated at every stage and supported the proposed revision of Rule 4 in the form
in which it was sent to the Supreme Court in 1990."), with supra text accompanying note 358 ("It will
help in the future if the rulemakers understand that the executive branch is not a monolith and that
differences of opinion are possible within, as well as between, agencies and departments. Such
understanding might have prevented members of the Advisory Committee from imputing a change of
position or reactiveness to comments the timing of which was in part a function of late notice to the
State Department."). Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison's Vision of the State: A Public
Choice Perspective, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1328, 1328-29 (1994) (inappropriate to treat U.S. government
"as a single hierarchical institution").
378. Phillips & Carrington, supra note 370, at 157.
379. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988). Apart from the dubiety
of the assertion as it relates to parties located in countries adhering to the Hague Convention, the
authors neglect, here as elsewhere in their article, the foreign relations implications in countries, such
as Switzerland, that are not parties to that treaty. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 119-23.
Attention to that dimension would help the authors answer some of the questions they pose about the
final version of amended Rule 4. See Phillips & Carrington, supra note 370, at 157.
380. See supra text accompanying notes 233-37, 279-85, 295-98.
381. See Phillips & Carrington, supra note 370, at 157-58. Of course, the authors' proposal is much
broader than a means to effect service within the United States and thereby avoid the requirements of
the Hague Service Convention. It would also authorize the federal courts to assert personal jurisdiction
according to a federal amenability standard.
382. See supra text accompanying notes 122-24, 233-37.
